Taiwan’s 2016 Presidential/Vice Presidential and Legislative Election: Reflections on the Nature of Taiwan’s Politics and Shifts Therein by Copper, John F
(1)
TAIWAN’S 2016 PRESIDENTIAL/VICE PRESIDENTIAL AND 
LEGISLATIVE ELECTION: REFLECTIONS ON THE NATURE 
OF TAIWAN’S POLITICS AND SHIFTS THEREIN 
John F. Copper* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
  I. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................... 2
  II. THE ELECTION’S BACKDROP ................................................. 5
  III. THE ECONOMY ......................................................................... 13
  IV. DOMESTIC POLITICS AND ISSUES ....................................... 21
  V. THE CHINA FACTOR ............................................................... 30
  VI. THE U.S. FACTOR ..................................................................... 38
  VII. THE CANDIDATES AND THE CAMPAIGN ........................... 47
 VIII. THE ELECTION RESULTS ....................................................... 58
  IX. CONCLUSIONS AND FORECASTS ........................................ 68
   GLOSSARY OF SELECTED CHINESE NAMES ..................... 79
* John F. Copper is the Stanley J. Buckman Professor of International Studies (emeritus) at 
Rhodes College in Memphis, Tennessee. He is the author of a number of books on Taiwan, 
including recently Taiwan’s Democracy on Trial: Political Change During the Chen Shui-bian
Era and Beyond in 2010; Taiwan: Nation-State or Province? (Sixth edition) in 2013; The KMT 
Returns to Power: Elections in Taiwan 2008 to 2012, in 2013; and Historical Dictionary of 
Taiwan (Republic of China) (Fourth edition) in 2015. He has written on Taiwan’s elections 
since 1980.
2 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 On Saturday January 16, 2016 voters in Taiwan (officially known 
as the Republic of China) went to the polls to cast ballots for candidates 
for president (and his or her running mate) and members of the Legisla-
tive Yuan (Taiwan’s lawmaking body of government).1 This was Tai-
wan’s fourteenth presidential election and its sixth wherein the electorate 
cast direct votes. It was the second that did not have an incumbent presi-
dent or vice president in the race. It was the second election that resulted 
in a change of ruling parties. It was the first election to see the main op-
position party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), win a majority 
in the legislature. 
This was also Taiwan’s second “joint” or “two-in-one” combined 
election of the two main branches of government. Initially, it was not 
certain whether or not it would; but in early 2015 the Central Election 
Commission decided, after three public hearings, that the executive and 
legislative contests would be held together. The reasons given were that 
it would boost citizen participation, better institutionalize the electoral 
process, minimize spending, and maintain stability in the society. Propo-
nents also cited a poll showing 68.4 percent of respondents favored a 
1.  For this author’s assessment of Taiwan’s previous elections, see John F. Copper with 
George P. Chen, Taiwan’s Elections: Political Development and Democratization in the Re-
public of China (Baltimore: University of Maryland School of Law, 1984); John F. Copper, 
Taiwan’s Recent Elections: Fulfilling the Democratic Promise (Baltimore: University of Mar-
yland School of Law, 1990); John F. Copper, Taiwan’s 1991 and 1992 Non-Supplemental 
Elections: Reaching a Higher State of Democracy (Lanham, MD: University Press of Ameri-
ca, 1994); John F. Copper, Taiwan’s Mid-1990s Elections: Taking the Final Steps to Democ-
racy (Westport, CT: Praeger Publisher, 1998); John F. Copper, Taiwan’s 1998 Legislative Yu-
an, Metropolitan Mayoral and City Council Elections: Confirming and Consolidating 
Democracy in the Republic of China (Baltimore: University of Maryland School of Law, 
1999); John F. Copper, Taiwan’s 2000 Presidential and Vice Presidential Election: Consoli-
dating Democracy and Creating a New Era of Politics (Baltimore: University of Maryland 
School of Law, 2000); John F. Copper, Taiwan’s 2001 Legislative, Magistrates and Mayors 
Election: Further Consolidating Democracy (Singapore: World Scientific/Singapore Universi-
ty Press, 2002); Taiwan’s 2004 Presidential and Vice Presidential Election: Democracy’s
Consolidation or Devolution (Baltimore: University of Maryland School of Law, 2004); Tai-
wan’s 2004 Legislative Election: Putting it in Perspective (Baltimore: University of Maryland 
School of Law, 2004); John F. Copper, Taiwan’s 2006 Metropolitan Mayoral and City Coun-
cil Elections and the Politics of Corruption (Baltimore: University of Maryland School of 
Law, 2006); John F. Copper, Taiwan’s 2008 Presidential and Vice Presidential Elections: Ma-
turing Democracy (Baltimore: University of Maryland School of Law, 2008); John F. Copper;, 
Taiwan’s 2010 Metropolitan City Elections: An Assessment of Taiwan’s Politics and a Predic-
tor of Future Elections (Baltimore: University of Maryland School of Law, 2010); John F. 
Copper, Taiwan’s 2012 Presidential/Vice Presidential and Legislative Elections: Assessing 
Current Politics and Charting the Future (Baltimore: University of Maryland School of Law, 
2012); and John F. Copper, Taiwan’s 2014 Nine-In-One Election: Gauging Politics, the Par-
ties, and Future Leaders (Baltimore: Carey School of Law University of Maryland, 2014). 
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joint election.2 Opponents countered that merging the elections would 
reduce the importance of legislative contest. There was also concern that 
under a joint election system the new legislature and the new president 
would not assume office at the same time and that might create prob-
lems.3
This election took place little over a year following Taiwan’s Nine-
in-One Election, a series of local elections in which voters picked the 
mayors and city councils of Taiwan’s metropolitan cities and local offi-
cials on down. Most pundits opined that because the opposition Demo-
cratic Progressive Party (DPP) won that election it had momentum going 
into this one, while the Nationalist Party or Kuomintang (KMT) lost and 
was divided and dispirited and was therefore handicapped.4 Also there 
were 700,000 new voters, mostly young, and this favored Tsai and the 
DPP.5
However, some observers opined this was a very different kind of 
election, a national election wherein the issues were broader and foreign 
relations played a much more important role. This disadvantaged the 
DPP. Another factor was the electorate’s disillusionment with party poli-
tics, its fading loyalty toward both of the two major parties, and it pining 
for a “new politics”—whatever that meant.6 This “third force,” as some 
called it, translated, it was thought, into voters favoring independent can-
didates (this was buoyed in part by the election of Taipei Mayor KO 
Wen-je, an independent and the most important official to win his post 
via the election in 2014). Finally, several new political parties formed.7
What they would do after the election was difficult to predict. They 
 2.  Li Hsin-feng and Chen Wei-han, “Merged elections gaining favor,” Taipei Times,
February 2, 2015 (online at taipeitimes.com). The KMT and the DPP both supported a merged 
election proposal with some reservations. The Taiwan Solidarity Union and the People First 
Party did not.   
 3.  “ROC legislative, presidential elections set for 2016,” Taiwan Today, February 13, 
2015 (online at taiwantoday.tw). In 2008, after the KMT won the presidential election Presi-
dent Chen remained in office for two months. During that time the price of oil spiked, but the 
government did not raise the prices of fuel and electricity thus forcing the Ma administration to 
raise them immediately after it took office, which was not popular. See “Political risk in 2016 
presidential, lawmaker election high,” Want China Times, February 21, 2015 (online at 
wantchinatimes.com). 
4. Copper, Taiwan’s 2014 Nine-In-One Election, p. 64. 
 5.  “An election battle for the identity of Taiwan,” BBC, January 1, 2016 (online at 
bbc.com). 
 6.  Copper, Taiwan’s 2014 Nine-In-One Election, p.59. 
 7.  “Sunflower seeds,” Economist, April 11, 2015, p. 37. For further details on the Sun-
flower Movement see Copper, Taiwan’s Nine-In-One Election, pp. 31-34. 
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aligned with the DPP; yet they also sought to act independently and rep-
resent new ideals.”8
The 2016 campaign was imbued with populism that was advanced 
wholeheartedly by opposition candidates. This both energized and dis-
torted public support for democracy, good government, and reform in 
Taiwan. Initially, it was difficult to discern whether constructive reform 
or emotional arguments over Taiwan’s independence or unification, in 
other words a future closely connected to China or not, had more spark. 
However, as the campaign proceeded clearly the issue over Taiwan’s in-
dependence overshadowed fixing problems in the system and/or promot-
ing better government; thus reform was either ignored or was framed by 
campaign partisanship.9
The KMT suffered throughout the campaign from a badly dimin-
ished brand, falling public support, and party disunity. This was mani-
fested in its difficulty in choosing a presidential candidate and then 
changing horses mid-stream. The ruling party’s original candidate, 
HUNG Hsiu-chu failed to win over much of the electorate, and was re-
placed. Eric Chu, who then became the KMT’s standard-bearer, did not 
gain much traction either in terms of appealing to voters. 
In a surprising contrast, at least from a historical perspective, the 
DPP’s candidate, TSAI Ing-wen, did not face these problems. Her party, 
which has been known for its factional disputes in the past (sometimes 
destructive ones), remained unified behind her. Its image and confidence 
improved up to and during the final weeks of the campaign. Above all, 
DPP leaders and supporters alike wanted to win. 
Thus, Tsai attained the presidency handily. In fact, she was victori-
ous by a larger margin than any candidate since Taiwan adopted a direct 
election system for presidential elections. Arguably just as important, the 
DPP won the legislative half of the election by a clear margin; this was 
somewhat unexpected. (Before Election Day most observers predicted 
that the KMT would lose its majority in the legislature, and that the DPP 
might have to try to form a coalition with some other parties and inde-
pendents.)
The two solid wins meant that the DPP became the party in control 
for the first time. This afforded the DPP with the good fortune of unim-
peded governance and an opportunity to profoundly change Taiwan po-
litically and in other ways. 
 8.  Gwenyth Wang, “A ‘Green’ Legislature: “Taiwan’s New Parliament More Different 
Than Ever,” Ketagalan Media, February 17, 2016 (online at ketagalanmedia.com). 
 9.  See Jin Kai, “Hong Kong and Taiwan: Populism or Democracy?” The Diplomat, 
April 16, 2015 (online at thediplomat.org). 
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During the election season there were two “elephants in the room”: 
China and the United States. In the past they had exerted a major influ-
ence on Taiwan’s politics and its elections. They did so again, though in 
different ways. 
Chinese leaders in Beijing pledged not to intrude during the cam-
paign, and didn’t. They apparently calculated this would be counterpro-
ductive. Nevertheless, both during and after the campaign they warned 
Tsai and the DPP about rejecting the 92 Consensus (an understanding 
reached in 1992 to the effect that there is only one China but each could 
have their own interpretation as to the meaning of China, which paved 
the way for much improved cross-Strait relations) and/or pursuing inde-
pendence. Beijing’s notifications, though, seemed more like a gentle re-
minder than a threat, or were something to activate later. 
The United States, which had heretofore unabashedly opposed the 
DPP’s call for independence and supported the KMT, changed its tune 
during the campaign. Officials in Washington applauded TSAi Ing-wen’s 
status quo cross-Strait policy and accorded her a cordial, in fact quite un-
precedented welcome, when she visited. During the rest of the campaign 
America’s Taiwan policy remained for the most part neutral, which 
helped Tsai and the DPP. 
While there were some incidences of nasty campaigning and even 
violence as during previous election times, they did not distract from an 
otherwise smooth election that advanced Taiwan’s democracy. In fact, 
Taiwan seemed unique in that its democracy was flourishing, as was not 
the case in most of the rest of the world. This was to Taiwan’s credit. 
Whether this might translate into global support for Taiwan, however, 
was quite another matter. 
II. THE ELECTION’S BACKDROP 
The year 2015 began with the green camp (the DPP and its allies, 
particularly the Taiwan Solidarity Union or TSU) basking in the glory of 
a victory in the November 2014 Nine-in-One election. DPP leaders as 
well as the party’s rank and file exuded confidence about the chances of 
winning this election, tempered somewhat by the reality that the 2014 
election win was probably as much a defeat for the KMT as it was a vic-
tory for the DPP. The electorate throughout the election had expressed 
some negative views toward all political parties. The KMT was mean-
while licking its wounds over its defeat, while many party leaders ex-
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pressed apprehensions that the party would suffer another election loss in 
2016.10
On a more abstruse level, during the election campaign both sides 
pondered whether the “watermelon theory” or the “pendulum theory” 
(terms used frequently in Taiwan) would prove correct.11 The former 
suggests that a person eating a watermelon finds it tasteful and cannot 
resist finishing it. In Western parlance an election win creates momen-
tum and a high probability that a party which triumphs in one election 
will win the next one. The pendulum theory, on the other hand, reflects 
the fact that defeated parties may learn quickly from their setbacks and 
try harder the next time around, while the winning party becomes com-
placent and even lazy, or worse—corrupt. It also recognizes that voters 
often have an urge for change and become disillusioned and even angry 
that parties that win elections do not keep their promises. The fact that 
there has been considerable turnover in ruling parties in recent years in 
democracies around the world supports the view this theory has the 
greater validity.12
The KMT acted to reform the party, resolve intra-party divisions, 
and repair the party’s image. But, as time passed it became apparent the 
reforms were not seriously pursued or were ineffective. This, however, 
needs further explanation. Immediately after the November 2014 election 
President Ma accepted blame for the defeat and apologized to the public 
and his fellow KMT members. He forthwith stepped down as chairman 
of the party. Members of the Ma administration, including Premier 
JIANG Yi-hua, then resigned.13 In other words, the KMT seemed for the 
moment to fully recognize its failings. 
New Taipei Mayor Eric Chu, the sole winner among KMT candi-
dates for mayors of the six metropolitan cities, was without contest elect-
ed leader of the Nationalist Party. Chu, it appeared, understood the situa-
tion. He compared the election defeat to a tsunami and called for soul 
searching, a revival of the party’s founding spirit, standing side-by-side 
with the people, and open-mindedness to attract young people. He called 
for changes in the tax system to correct what he tagged as a lack of fair-
ness in the market economy. He went on to say that while President Ma 
bore responsibility for the election defeat, “life in general,” meaning 
 10.  See Copper, Taiwan’s 2014 Nine-In-One Election, pp. 64-70. 
 11.  See Copper, The KMT Returns to Power, pp. 32-33 and pp. 113-16 for details on both 
of these theories. 
 12.  See John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, The Fourth Revolution: The Global 
Race to Reinvent the State (New York: Penguin, 2014), p. 11.  The authors associate this with 
a general decline in public confidence in government and political institutions. 
 13.  Copper, Taiwan’s 2014 Nine-In-One Election, p. 52. 
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deeper problems, were also relevant and the entire party should share 
blame.14
But Chu’ failed to deal with what some called the KMT’s “sinking 
ship” or a number of top officials leaving the party. In January, Legisla-
tor HSU Hsin-ying withdrew from the KMT. Two days later, National 
Development Council minister KUAN Chung-ming did the same. Then 
National Security Council secretary general KING Pu-tsung, considered 
President Ma’s most trusted advisor, left the Ma administration. Shortly 
thereafter Mainland Affairs Council Minister WANG Yu-chi resigned.15
Virtually all top Ma officials stepped down (although many were reap-
pointed to new jobs). 
The bottom line was that Chu had to fix a fractured party. His first 
step was to arrange reconciliation with Legislative Speaker WANG Jin-
pyng. In September 2013, President Ma had accused Wang of corruption, 
based on charges for which there seemed to be clear evidence, and or-
chestrated his dismissal from the party and the speakership. But this was 
not handled well and didn’t pass muster with many party members, and 
Wang remained where he was. The incident further divided the party, 
which was already split by one faction aligned against another. It also 
further exposed an ethnic divide in the party.16
In short, Chu had to deal with the end of the Ma era: the retiring of 
many of the old guard, a loss of faith among many party members, Ma’s 
consistently low public approval ratings, the decline of public support for 
its elite politics, the rise of populism, and much more. Further complicat-
ing matters was the issue of Chu being a candidate in the presidential 
election, or not. Chu said he would not be; he had, he asserted and 
pledged to finish his term as mayor when campaigning in 2014. Howev-
er, some asked: “If Chu didn’t have the courage to run for president how 
could he fix the party?17
If Chu’s challenges appeared formidable TSAI Ing-wen’s were ob-
viously less so. Tsai was reelected chairwoman of the DPP in May 2014. 
She finished building party unity leading up to and during the campaign 
before the November Nine-in-One election. She kept her party’s candi-
dates from alienating voters (as well as the United States and China) by 
 14.  Alan D. Romberg, “Cross-Strait Relations: The Times They Are A-Changin,’” China 
Leadership Monitor, March 19, 2015, p. 4 (online at chinaleadershipmonitor.org).
 15.  Shyu-tu Lee, “KMT inexorably slides into oblivion,” Taipei Times, February 18, 2015 
(online at taipeitimes.com). 
 16.  Lawrence Chung, “Ma Ying-jeou risks splitting Taiwan’s KMT, lawmakers warn,”
South China Morning Post, September 10, 2013 (online at scmp.com). 
 17.  “To rescue the KMT, Chu must be bold and swift,” Want China Times, February 2, 
2015 (online at wantchinatimes.com).
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admonishing them to keep their mouths closed about former president 
CHEN Shui-bian, the 1992 Consensus, Taiwan’s independence, one 
China, and some other hot button divisive issues. Most listened to her.18
But Tsai was not completely free of problems. Many party support-
ers as well as some of its top leaders thought the results of that election 
meant keeping silent was no longer necessary. In the election’s wake 
DPP supporters, the party’s sympathetic media, and in some cases its 
leaders, stated that the election had changed things, and that China and 
the United States would have to “come around.”19 Tsai also had to try to 
restrain (and counsel) and maintain cordial ties with KO Wen-je, the 
popular independent (but pro-DPP) Taipei City mayor the DPP had sup-
ported and who won election handily in 2014.20 Ko was notorious for 
making controversial and often impolitic statements, and now, deci-
sions.21 But he remained popular, and for many members, offered a 
breath of fresh air in politics, not to mention an alternative to the two 
parties. Thus he was a possible threat to the DPP. 
On the other hand the DPP’s confidence about its future and its 
hopes for winning the election were justified by a host of public opinion 
surveys. According to a poll conducted by Taiwan Thinktank in Febru-
ary, more than 75 percent of citizens polled believed Tsai would win the 
2016 election, including a similar percentage of pan-blue (supporters of 
the KMT, the People First Party, the New Party) respondents. Over 50 
percent thought the DPP would win more than half of the seats in the leg-
islature. In the same survey TSAI Ing-wen’s performance was deemed 
favorable by 63 percent of those queried.22
 18.  Copper, Taiwan’s Nine-in-One Election, p. 38. 
 19.  See “DPP gains should prompt Beijing to modify its approach,” Want China Times,
December 2, 2014 (online at wantchinatimes.com). 
 20.  Tsai could, of course, claim that Ko was not a member of the DPP and thus downplay 
what he said that did not fit her narrative during the campaign. However, it was known that Ko 
and the DPP leadership had made a verbal agreement in June 2014 to the effect that Ko would 
coordinate his platform with other DPP mayoral candidates and would stump for DPP candi-
dates running for the Taipei City Council among other pledges of cooperation. 
 21.  Ko, for example, stated in public that Taiwan’s colonization contributed to progress 
and praised former President Chiang Ching-kuo for the government’s integrity during his pres-
idency. These statements did not at all fit the DPP’s narrative. Ko also made diplomatic gaffes 
and displayed odd mannerism in public that he attributed to Asperger syndrome. See 
“EDITORIAL; The mis-education of Ko Wen-je,” Taipei Times, February 4, 2015 (online at 
taipeitimes.com). Ko also launched policies that were controversial and that sometimes gener-
ated strong resistance. Ko, however, was quick to correct mistakes and openly apologized 
when necessary. He also remained popular, some said, because he was so different from other 
politicians. 
 22.  Lao lok-sin, “Power shift expected in 2016: poll,” Taipei Times, February 10, 2015 
(online at taipeitimes.com). 
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Meanwhile, on January 5, the Ma administration granted former 
president CHEN Shui-bian a medical parole allowing Chen to leave  
prison to be with his family in south Taiwan. The reasons for granting 
the release were not clear; nor were what the effects might be. Some said 
President Ma acted on humanitarian grounds. Others said he sought to 
create a diversion from problems he and his party faced in the wake of 
the November 2014 election defeat. Still others said he sought to cause a 
quandary for TSAI Ing-wen, who was at that time making efforts to 
maintain party unity and formulate a more moderate China policy.23
Chen’s medical parole was subsequently extended by three months;
the reason given was his deteriorating health—including severe depres-
sion and early signs of Parkinson’s disease. The parole board, however, 
stated that the extension did not mean Chen was not guilty of the crimes 
he had been convicted of or that it would affect the twenty-year sentence 
he had received, of which he had served six years.24 In any event, shortly 
after this the DPP accepted Chen’s son, CHEN Chih-chung’s, reapplica-
tion for party membership (that had been rescinded in 2008) and the 
younger Chen forthwith announced he would run for a seat in the legisla-
ture.25
In late February, TSAI Ing-wen declared that a “union” of DPP and 
“grassroots reformers” might be formed in the legislature.26 Tsai’s com-
ment mirrored her concern that the DPP would not obtain a majority in 
the legislature (though neither would the KMT) and, if elected, she 
would need allies to form a ruling coalition. At the time HUNG Tsu-
yung, the sister of an army recruit whose death in 2013 during training 
set off a series of protests against the military (and by inference the 
KMT), declared that she would run for a legislative seat sponsored by the 
newly founded New Power Party (NPP). More talk of a coalition fol-
lowed when it was reported that James Soong, former KMT general sec-
retary and candidate for president in 2000 and vice president in 2004, 
might form a joint ticket with KO Wen-je (though Ko denied this and 
there was subsequently a report in the media Soong and his People First 
 23.  See “A-bian back home,” Economist, January 10, 2015, pp. 35-36. 
 24.  “Medical parole for Chen Shui-bian extended by 3 months,” Taiwan News, February 
4, 2015 (online at taiwannews.com.tw). See also See Chi-hao James Lo, “Son of Chen with-
draws from election to jump into media,” China Post, May 27, 2015 (online at 
chinapost.com.tw). 
 25.  Loa lok-sin, “DPP takes back Chen Chih-chung,” Taipei Times, February 26, 2015 
(online at taipeitimes.com). In May, however, the younger Chen withdrew from legislative
race to pursue an opportunity in radio where he could speak on behalf of his father.  
 26.  Chen Wei-han, “Tsai open to cooperative options,” Taipei Times, February 25, 2015 
(online at taipeitimes.com). 
10 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES
Party would form a joint ticket with the KMT).27 Even more such talk of 
a coalition ensued when HUANG Kuo-chang, leader of the Sunflower 
Movement, announced he would join the New Power Party and run for a 
seat in the legislature.28 Finally, soon after another new party, the Taiwan 
Independence Party, was launched.29
On February 28, TSAI Ing-wen addressed an event commemorating 
the anniversary of the 228 Incident (when local citizens in February 1947 
revolted against the KMT-run government and many were killed). Tsai 
spoke of how Taiwan’s youth would benefit from “transformative jus-
tice, democratic education, and fairness” if the DPP won the 2016 elec-
tion. Taipei City Mayor Ko was invited to the event, but he did not at-
tend. Ko instead spoke at a gathering attended by President Ma. Ko 
talked in emotional terms about the death of his grandfather during the 
incident. But Ko also called on people to put aside hate and learn the 
truth of the event. President Ma and Premier Mao promised to continue 
to heal rifts in the society.30
At this time the DPP remained the frontrunner in the campaign. An 
opinion survey published by Want China Times Media Group showed 
that more people (41.7 percent) believed TSAI Ing-wen would win the 
election against Eric Chu or WANG Jin-pyng (33.1 percent) if either de-
cided to run. Taipei Mayor Ko, however, also polled high with 36.9 per-
cent of respondents saying they would support him, though 49.2 percent 
said they expected him to campaign for Tsai.31
On March 18, students and other activists celebrated the anniversary 
of the Sunflower Movement with a number of events and announcements 
of new goals. They urged legislators to pass amendments to the Referen-
dum Law and the Election and Recall Law. They called for debate on the 
Constitution and the electoral system. They asked that action on the issue 
of trade with China be held in abeyance before the post-2016 election in-
auguration. The tenor of the activities was clearly anti-Ma and anti-
 27.  See Mathew Strong, “Ko and Soong dismiss election speculation,” Taiwan News, 
May 6, 2015 (online at taiwannews.com.tw); Huang Su-yu, “James Soong hints at KMT-PFP 
coalition in 2016,” Want China Times, May 2, 2015 (online at wantchinatimes.com). 
 28.  Li Wen “Top Sunflower joints NPP, eyes legislative run,” Taipei Times, May 5, 2015 
(online at taipeitimes.com). 
 29.  Jason Pan, “Taiwan Independence Party is inaugurated,” Taipei Times, May 9, 2015 
(online at taipeitimes.com). 
 30.  “Mayor and president meet at 228 ceremony,” Taiwan News, February 28, 2015 
(online at taiwannews.com.tw). It was uncertain if he refused to shake hands with President 
Ma or considered it improper since he was holding a wet tissue and thought it unhygienic and 
improper.
 31.  “57.4% of voters favor DPP for Taiwan’s presidential election,” Want China Times,
February 28, 2015 (online at wantchinatimes.com). 
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KMT.32 TSAI Ing-wen spoke of cooperation with the Sunflower support-
ers. But she seemed to have mixed feelings about the movement because 
she thought their efforts to seek seats in the legislature might hurt DPP 
candidates.33
KMT chairman Eric Chu also addressed the Sunflower anniversary 
event. He stated that the KMT is reflecting on its mistakes, noting its 
heretofore “lopsided” focus on economic growth and cross-strait rela-
tions at the expense of a fair distribution of wealth and intergenerational 
equality, which was ill advised. He pledged that the KMT would give 
more thought to housing and other issues of concern to young people. 
Furthermore, he promised tax-reform legislation so that the rich would 
pay more. Lastly, he criticized the education system that produced grad-
uates that did not fit the job market.34 Meanwhile, business leaders de-
clared that the Sunflower Movement had hurt the economy and that 
growth in the past year had improved, but was not as fast as it should 
have been.35
At that juncture, it was unclear if the Sunflower Movement would 
regroup and seriously impact this election. Only around 100 students 
showed up to renew its activities on its first-year anniversary.36
Subsequently Chairwoman Tsai proposed what became known as 
her “status quo policy” as the basis for relations with China. Both Presi-
dent Ma and KMT spokespersons, as well as some DPP leaders, soundly 
criticized her pronouncement. Ma contended that her plan had no con-
tent, that it depended on the 1992 Consensus, and that it needed to em-
body the Cross-Strait Trade in Services Agreement and other arrange-
ments to increase trade and commercial relations with China that the 
DPP had opposed. Some DPP leaders called her proposal boring and said 
it was easy to talk about but difficult to do. Beijing took a wait-and-see 
attitude.37
However, Tsai’s main purpose was to signal she wanted cordial re-
lations with China and persuade Washington that she would not ignite a 
 32.  “Focus on Legislative Yuan on first Sunflowers anniversary,” Taiwan News, March 
18, 2015 (online at taiwannews.com.tw). 
 33.  “Tsai Ing-wen: 318 plus one year brings ‘mixed feelings,’” Taiwan News, March 17, 
2015 (online at taiwannews.com.tw). 
 34.  Ho Yu-hua and Chen Wei-han, “SUNFLOWER ANNIVERSARY: Chu says KMT to 
address youth issues, inequality,” Taipei Times, March 19, 2015 (online at taipeitimes.com). 
 35.  Ecru Lin, “Sunflower protest slowed down nation: industry,” China Post, March 19, 
2015 (online at chinapost.com.tw). 
 36.  “Taiwanese mark first anniversary of Sunflower Movement,” Associated Press, 
March 23, 2015 (online at ap.com). 
 37.  This point is assessed in greater detail below. 
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cross-Strait conflict. China’s reaction was not immediate and the U.S. 
response to the policy was not positive. Barbara Schrage, former manag-
ing director of the American Institute in Taiwan, stated that a difficult 
issue remained—the 92 Consensus.38
Tsai’s status quo policy was indeed vague. She stated, for example, 
that it was founded on the “existing ROC constitutional order and the ac-
cumulated outcomes of more than 20 years of negotiations and exchang-
es.” Alas what Tsai said could be interpreted in a host of ways. But given 
she did not want to provoke Chinese leaders in Beijing and also wished 
to avoid appearing soft on the independence issue she had to be impre-
cise.39 In fact, some observers labeled her policy “strategic ambiguity.”40
Nevertheless, she won support for her policy with the electorate in 
Taiwan. The Taiwan Brain Trust conducted a poll that showed 70 per-
cent of people in Taiwan approved and an even higher number felt she 
was correct in proposing it, although almost half believed maintaining 
the status quo meant keeping the 92 Consensus.41 In any case, Tsai 
seemed to have created a policy toward China that could win votes and 
eventually gain her favor with the United States. 
In any event, Tsai sought to focus on domestic issues that were her 
strength and the KMT’s weakness. She charged that President Ma had 
not reprioritized his agenda to focus on the economy, income distribu-
tion, food safety, etc.42 She put forward her own ideas, which resonated 
with voters, and maintained a good image. Helping her, in June TSAI 
Ing-wen was on the cover of Time (Asia edition).43
Further bolstering Tsai’s candidacy were more polls that indicated 
she and the DPP were popular with Taiwan’s citizens.44 Repeated sur-
veys showed that Tsai was easily the frontrunner. In August, an average 
of ten polls showed Tsai at 38 percent, the KMT’s HUNG Hsiu-chu, the 
KMT’s elected presidential candidate in July, at 18 percent, and James 
 38.  Enru Lin, “DPP will strive to maintain status quo,” China Post, March 22, 2015 
(online at chinapost.com.tw). 
 39.  See Alan D. Romberg, “Consolidating Positions,” China Leadership Monitor, Sep-
tember 9, 2015  (online at chinaleadershipmonitor.org) for further details. 
 40.  Emily Chen, “The DPP’s strategic ambiguity toward China,” PacNet (CSIS), August 
19, 2015 (online at csis.org). 
 41.  Somy Murtaugh, “Tsai’s call for status quo in cross-strait relations criticized,” Tai-
wan News, April 30, 2015 (online at taiwannews.com.tw). 
 42.  Romberg, “Squaring the Circle: Adhering to Principle, Embracing Ambiguity,” China 
Leadership Monitor, July 14, 2015, p. 4 (online at chinaleadershipmonitor.org). 
 43.  Emily Rauhala, “She could lead the only Chinese democracy, and that makes Beijing 
nervous,” Time, June 29, 2015. 
 44.  See, for example, “Taiwan Insider,” Thinking Taiwan, January 27 to July 3, 2015 
(online at thinking-taiwan.com).
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Soong, the People First Party’s candidate, at 20 percent.45 Meanwhile, 
surveys showed that more people were identifying as Taiwanese rather 
than Chinese, which worked to the advantage of Tsai and the DPP.46
As the fourth quarter of 2015 approached, a time when pundits sug-
gested the campaign had reached a final stage, TSAI Ing-wen focused 
even more on issues that she perceived would ensure her election and 
would help her party win a majority in the Legislative Yuan. Some in her 
party opined that the DPP might win as many as 64 seats. Meanwhile, 
HUNG Hsiu-chu lost both credibility and public support when she re-
ferred to “common interpretations” about one China instead of “respec-
tive interpretations” of the 92 Consensus. Her view was seen as very 
overly pro-unification. Meanwhile, the DPP and its allies continued their 
criticism of President Ma and the KMT for their poor governance and not 
caring about citizens.47
III.   THE ECONOMY 
One theory about elections in Taiwan that compliments, if not su-
persedes, all others is that voters vote according to their pocketbooks.48
In other words, the electorate favors a leader, a party, or a bloc (of par-
ties) that has the best record for promoting economic growth and/or 
makes a convincing case it can oversee future economic growth and 
prosperity.49
However, in recent years persuading voters of this has become more 
complicated. In 2000, CHEN Shui-bian ran a campaign espousing the 
view that he could operate the government both cheaper and more effi-
ciently (since the KMT was corrupt) and further that his government 
 45.  “Taiwan’s 2016 Presidential Election,” Resource Page (Carnegie Endowment for In-
ternational Peace), September 9, 2015 (online at carnegieendowment.org). 
 46.  See Tseng Wei-chen and Chen Wei-han, “‘Taiwanese’ identity hits record level,”
Taipei Times, January 26, 2015 (online at taipeitimes.com). According to a survey done by the 
National Chengchi University 60.6 percent identified as Taiwanese. This figure remained simi-
lar for some months after this. Identifying as Taiwanese means the person is more likely to 
vote for the DPP than the KMT (which is favored by those who identify as Chinese or both 
Chinese and Taiwanese). 
 47.  Alan D. Romberg, “Consolidating Positions,” China Leadership Monitor, September 
9, 2015 (online at chinaleadershipmonitor.org). 
 48.  The reason for this is that government almost universally seeks to control their econ-
omies and dominate economic matters. In democratic systems they also seek to maximize their 
support among their citizens and managing the economy is a way to accomplish this. See An-
thony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), p. 1 
and p. 11. Applying this theory to Taiwan, see Copper, The KMT Returns to Power, p. 115. 
Also see Eun-Jung Choi, “Economic Voting in Taiwan: The Significance of Education and 
Lifetime Economic Experiences,” Asian Survey, October 2010, pp. 990-1010. 
 49.  To apply this to Taiwan, see Copper, The KMT Returns to Power, p. 175 and p. 210. 
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could sustain good growth while at the same time ensuring a fairer distri-
bution of wealth. Chen’s ideas were to a considerable extent accepted as 
evidenced by his election victory.50
But President Chen oversaw a recession his first year in office that 
saw the gross domestic product (GDP) growth plummet into negative ter-
ritory and the unemployment rate increase to what most people thought 
was impossible. In his second term Taiwan’s GDP growth was respecta-
ble, but Chen’s economic policies were no longer as appealing as the 
KMT’s.
Hence, as noted in 2008 former Taipei Mayor MA Ying-jeou won 
the presidency based to a large extent on the popular belief he could en-
gineer impressive economic growth as the KMT had done in the past and 
the DPP could not. However, Taiwan was hit hard by the global reces-
sion that year. This hurt his reputation and weakened his presidency. For-
tunately for Ma, by late 2009 Taiwan’s economy had bounced back and 
growth was not just respectable but was very impressive. This helped the 
KMT win the collection of local elections in 2010.51 But, the economy 
turned south again and Ma and the KMT fared less well in the 2012 
combined executive and legislative election. They won in considerable 
measure due to the fact the opposition did not offer better ideas for eco-
nomic growth.52
Leading up to the 2014 Nine-in-One local election, the economy 
early on was performing somewhat below its weight; later it did a bit 
above the bar (gauged mainly by comparing Taiwan’s GDP growth with 
the other three “Asian tigers”—South Korea, Hong Kong and Singa-
pore—that constitutes Taiwan’s voters’ frame of reference). However, 
trumping concern about GDP growth were other related issues: unem-
ployment, stagnant wages, an increase of poor paying jobs (and not good 
ones), growing income and wealth inequality, Taiwan’s companies hol-
lowing out or moving to China, a weakening of the work ethic, and a 
brain drain.53 Meanwhile, Taiwan’s economic reliance on China engen-
 50.  It is probably not accurate to say that Chen’s economic agenda gave him the election 
victory. However, to some degree it undermined the KMT’s argument that it was the only par-
ty that could do well in running the economy and maintaining growth or that expansion of the 
gross domestic product per se was all-important. In any case, the best explanation for Chen’s
victory was the fact the KMT suffered a serious party split. See Copper, Taiwan’s 2000 Presi-
dential and Vice Presidential Election, p. 53. 
 51.  Copper, Taiwan’s 2010 Metropolitan City Elections, p. 54. 
 52.  Copper, Taiwan’s 2012 Presidential/Vice Presidential and Legislative Election, pp. 
81-82.
 53.  Copper, Taiwan’s 2014 Nine-in-One Election, p. 59. 
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dered public angst that transmogrified into something close to alarm, or 
this was made so by the opposition.54
The DPP won the economic argument (since it handily won the 
election). It was abetted by the Sunflower Movement (a youth protest 
movement that nominally centered on the perceived lack of transparency 
regarding an agreement with China on trade in services. Voters linked 
what they deemed less than adequate economic growth to Taiwan’s eco-
nomic inequity, and a lack of fairness or the rich getting richer and the 
poor getting poorer, (which ties with China allegedly caused)).55
Economic issues remained heavy on the minds of voters during the 
months leading up to January 2016. Was the ruling party able to reignite 
credible economic growth? Could the KMT and the government enhance 
Taiwan’s employment prospects and reduce the income and wealth gaps?
And, if not, how much was it to blame for current economic conditions? 
Was the global economy a factor? To what extent was China accountable 
for Taiwan’s economic health, or lack thereof? Was Taiwan overly de-
pendent on China and what should it do about it? 
In early 2015, looking back at the previous quarter Taiwan’s econ-
omy appeared to be quite strong and moving on an upward trajectory. 
The previous year had ended with Taiwan’s GDP growing at 3.8 per-
cent—higher than the other Asian tigers (more than a point above Hong 
Kong’s 2.5 percent growth). Taiwan’s growth was also well above the 
worlds average of 2.9 percent and better than Japan, Europe, and the 
United States.56 On the less optimistic front, Taiwan had made little pro-
gress establishing the free economic pilot zones proposed by President 
Ma in 2012 and approved by the cabinet in August 2013. The DPP op-
posed the proposal. Thus the plan stalled.57
In March, the Asian Development Bank issued a forecast of Tai-
wan’s GDP growth for the year, putting it at 3.7 percent—the highest in 
three years.58 This prediction was proximate to those made by several 
other organizations.59 Meanwhile, Taiwan’s unemployment dropped to 
 54.  Ibid., p. 22. 
 55.  Ibid., p. 59. 
 56.  “Economic and financial indicators” and “World GDP,” Economist, March 21, 2015, 
p. 80 and p. 81. 
 57.  “DPP has not followed up on alternatives to FEPZ plan,” Want China Times, Febru-
ary 7, 2015 (online at wantchinatimes.com). 
 58.  “ADB forecasts Taiwan GDP economic growth of 3.7 percent for 2015,” China Post,
March 25, 2015 (online at chinapost.com.tw). 
 59.  Yuanta Polaris and the Economist, for example, made similar predictions. 
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the lowest level in fourteen years.60 As a result Taiwan’s American 
Chamber of Commerce, in its annual Business Climate Survey, reported 
60 percent of its members espoused optimism about Taiwan’s economic 
prospects for the next five years. AmCham, however, expressed concern 
(and criticism) about inconsistent regulations, excessive bureaucracy, 
and outdated laws. The organization also cited political wrangling, Tai-
wan’s overall investment climate, difficulties joining the Trans-Pacific
Partnership deal being advanced by the United States, and the incomplete 
ratification of the cross-Strait trade in services agreement with China.61
In contrast to AmCham’s assessment there were other less optimistic re-
ports or warnings about the economy. The Importers and Exporters As-
sociation of Taipei predicted that Taiwan’s trade competitiveness would 
fall.62 Another matter suggesting caution concerned Taiwan’s banks’ ex-
posure to China that was at a record high, while Taiwan’s brain drain 
caused by stagnant salaries in the high tech sector continued to hurt its 
competiveness.63
In April, President Ma reaffirmed Taiwan’s development was on the 
right track and linked Taiwan’s economic growth to closer cross-Strait 
ties and expansion in the global economy. Ma argued that his policies 
were working.64 At the end of the month the media reported that Tai-
wan’s Consumer Confidence Index hit an all-time high, helped by high 
stock investments.65 However, in a survey conducted by the Social Dem-
ocratic Party, most workers (62 percent) said their salaries were insuffi-
cient to pay for basic living expenses. In fact, more than 80 percent of 
low paid workers said this.66 Thus it remained uncertain as to what extent 
economic growth was “seeping down.”
In addition, a better economy was not having a salutary effect on 
Taiwan’s youth. There were several explanations for this: One, Taiwan 
 60.  “Unemployment drops to lowest level in 14 years in Taiwan,” Want China Times,
January 23, 2015 (online at wantchinatimes.com). The Directorate General of Budget, Ac-
counting and Statistics supplied this figure. 
 61.  “AmCham report raises six Achilles’ heels for Taiwan,” Want China Times, January 
19, 2015 (online at wantchinatimes.com).
 62.  “Taiwan trade competitiveness waning: survey,” Want China Times, January 24, 2015 
(online at wantchinatimes.com). 
 63.  “Taiwanese banks’ exposure to China hits new high,” and  “Serious brain drain con-
tinues in Taiwan’s job market: ECCT,” Want China Times, January 11, 2015 and January 31, 
2015 (online at wantchinatimes.com.)
 64.  “President Ma reaffirms Taiwan’s development path,” Taiwan Today, April 8, 2015 
(online at taiwantoday.tw). 
 65.  “ROC consumer confidence hits new heights in April,” Taiwan Today, April 28, 2014 
(online at taiwantoday.tw). 
 66.  Stacy Hsu, “Low pay, long hours still a problem, survey shows,” Taipei Times, May 
2, 2015 (online at taipeitimes.com). 
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had become a welfare state (like the U.S. and Europe and more so than 
other Asian countries). Young people were scarcely beneficiaries of this. 
The military, civil servants, and teachers received generous retirement 
benefits not to mention subsidized rates of interest on their savings. 
There were no such programs in place to help young people. Further-
more, it appeared the government could do little to help its youth because 
Taiwan had a burdensome national debt. Taiwan’s arrears were reported 
to have reached NT$6 trillion, not including NT$17 trillion in other lia-
bilities—or 160 percent of the GDP.67 This, it was said, was roughly the 
same as Greece at the time of its default. Going forward, due to Taiwan’s 
low birth rate, this burden would fall heavily on young people. Then, 
many of Taiwan’s companies were still moving operations overseas 
causing job opportunities to contract. Many jobs went to China. While 
most young people said they would like to take employment in China, 
many realized they would have to work harder and they didn’t like the 
prospects of that. Making the situation worse, Taiwan had a glut of 
young people with redundant college degrees, a problem exacerbated by 
the fact that Taiwan’s institutions of higher learning were falling behind 
their peers in ranking while university brands had increased in im-
portance.68 This resulted in some calling Taiwan’s youth a “lost genera-
tion.”69 Combined with a bleeding of Taiwan’s top talent because of oth-
er Asian nations (notably Hong Kong and China) paying increasingly 
better salaries Taiwan was said to becoming the world’s most talent defi-
cit country.70
In this context a point of contention arose between the KMT and the 
DPP over the issue of raises given to public sector employees versus 
workers in the private sector. DPP officials charged that the government 
as a regular practice had provided salary increases to civil servants to 
keep their votes and in so doing violated the Labor Standards Act.71 Nei-
 67.  “Debt obligation near NT$24 tril: TIER,” China Post, July 15, 2015 (online at 
chinapost.com.tw). This figure was based on current debt and future spending obligations. It 
exaggerated the gravity of the situation yet it was shocking to the public. 
 68.  “Taiwanese schools disappearing from the Asian rankings,” Taipei Times, June 10, 
2015 (online at taipeitimes.com). 
 69.  “The LIBERTY TIMES EDITORIAL: Tragedy of the young generation,” Taipei 
Times, February 17, 2015 (online at taipeitimes.com). 
 70.  “Taiwan’s poor economic situation worsened by brain drain,” Want China Times,
February 18, 2015 (online at wantchinatimes.com). The claim Taiwan will be the worst coun-
try in the world in terms of its brain drain was made by the British research report Global Tal-
ent 2021. According to the study Taiwan had been losing “brains” at a rate of 27,000 per year 
for more than ten years while regulations and red tape not to mention promoting local national-
ism alienated outsiders and discourage international talent from coming to Taiwan. 
 71.  Alison Hsiao, “KMT puts pay raises at top of agenda,” Taipei Times, March 5, 2015 
(online at taipeitimes.com. com). 
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ther side, however, addressed seriously the need for policies that would 
slow the brain drain. Neither gave much attention to the fact that, accord-
ing to the International Labor Organization, global unemployment passed 
212 million and 42 million new jobs were needed annually just to keep 
up, while 36 percent of employers reported difficulties finding talent (a 
seven year high), and finally that additional capital (spending) was not 
the answer.72
In June, optimism about Taiwan’s economic prospects continued to 
decline. According to a survey conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers in 
Taiwan, only 33 percent of CEOs were confident about the economy 
compared to 60 percent a year earlier. Slower growth in China and the 
United States were the reasons cited. Less cordial relations with China 
were also a major factor since 82 percent of Taiwan’s companies report-
ed China was their main target of expansion compared to 78 percent the 
year before.73
In fact, some analysts believed Taiwan’s economy was in trouble 
due to a decline in sales to China, caused by the DPP provoking cross-
Strait tensions following its 2014 election victory, China signing a free 
trade agreement with South Korea (one of Taiwan’s competitors for ex-
ports), no movement on the trade in services agreement, and China tak-
ing more of the global supply chain in electronics and related products. 
Taiwan’s exports to China fell by 7.3 percent in the first four months of 
the year causing a 6.2 percent decline in exports overall.74 Precisely half 
of the decline in foreign orders was accounted for by China cutting back 
for five consecutive months.75
In July, the Miaoli County government announced that it did not 
have the funds to pay its employees and asked for assistance from the 
central government. This precipitated fears that Taiwan was really in 
similar straits to Greece. Miaoli Magistrate HSU Yao-chang told Premier 
Mao that the county was NT$64.8 billion in debt and was obligated to 
spend NT$600 million on salaries and another NT$600 million on pen-
sions.76 Opposition politicians, including candidates for office in the 
 72.  See Klaus Schwab, “Talent versus capital in 21st century,” Taipei Times, May 19, 
2015 (online at taipeitimes.com). 
 73.  Yeh Wen-yih, “Taiwan CEOs less confident about growth: survey,” Want China 
Times, June 13, 2015 (online at wantchinatimes.com). 
 74.  “Taiwan brands should learn from HTC’s effort and prioritize China,” Want China 
Times, June 12, 2015 (online at wantchinatimes.com). 
 75.  John Liu, “Foreign orders fall for a second month,” China Post, June 24, 2015 (online 
at chinapost.com.tw). 
 76.  “Miaoli’s government out of money to pay salaries: county magistrate,” China Post, 
July 11, 2015 (online at chinapost.com.tw). 
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coming election, excoriated the Ma administration for excessive welfare 
policies, an unfair tax system, and economic and political mistakes that 
ruined Taiwan’s “economic miracle.”77
Throughout the summer the news about the economy did not en-
courage much hope and by autumn prospects looked even worse. In mid-
October, the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research, one of Tai-
wan’s well-known think tanks, forecast that the economy would end the 
year with just 0.9 percent growth. It laid the blame on contracting exports 
of 13.8 percent during July to September noting that exports comprised 
60 percent of Taiwan’s economy and that 40 percent go to China. The 
think tank also asserted that a 7.2 percent depreciation of the Taiwan dol-
lar against the U.S. dollar last quarter failed to have a positive impact.78
Another think tank reported a 7.4 percent drop in manufacturing output, 
which it attributed to a slowing of the global economy and the rise of 
supply chains in China.79 A decline in bank lending and fewer purchases 
of luxury homes also appeared to indicate that a turnaround would not 
occur soon.80 In November, it was reported that export orders were still 
in decline.81
Meanwhile, opponents of the Ma administration charged that the 
true state of the economy had been covered up and that the administra-
tion had raided the government pension fund to prop up the stock mar-
ket.82 Critics of the government also charged that new fiscal policies 
would not work well to revitalize the economy inasmuch as they had 
been used too frequently for too long to help the economy and influence 
elections.83
During December, the month preceding the election, the economic 
news in Taiwan was still unfavorable. Export orders dropped for the 
 77.  “Taiwan from Little Dragon to New Greece,” Taiwan News, July 16, 2015 (online at 
taiwannews.com.tw). 
 78.  Crystal Hsu, “CIER cuts GDP forecast to 0.9 percent,” Taipei Times, October 16, 
2015 (online at taipeitimes.com). 
 79.  John Liu, “Nation may see 7.36 drop in manufacturing output,” China Post, October 
22, 2015 (online at chinapost.com.tw). The think tank mentioned was the Industrial Economic 
and Knowledge Center. 
 80.  “Weak economy slowing loan growth: commission,” Taipei Times, October 12, 2015 
(online at taipeitimes.com) and “Luxury home transactions in New Taipei down 67% this 
year,” Want China Times, October 20, 2015 (online at wantchinatimes.com.tw). 
 81.  John Liu, “Export orders decline for seventh month in a row,” China Post, November 
21, 2015 (online at chinapost.com.tw). 
 82.  Kuo Chen-hero, “Economy’s true state kept from the public,” Taipei Times, October 
14, 2015 (online at taipeitimes.com). 
 83.  “Fiscal policies not enough to revitalize Taiwan’s economy,” Watch China Times,
October 24, 2015 (online at wantchinatimes.com.tw). 
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eighth consecutive month, attributed to a lower value of Taiwan’s petro-
chemical products, a sluggish global economy, and lower economic 
growth in China.84 Unemployment ticked upward by 0.01 percent. The 
industrial production index declined for the seventh consecutive month, 
with manufacturing falling by 5.03 percent.85 All of this provided grist 
for critics of the Ma administration to label its economic policy a failure 
and warn of China’s “economic invasion” of Taiwan.86
In summary, the economic news leading up to the election was 
troubling for the KMT. In that context TSAI Ing-wen’s credentials for 
dealing with economic problems were in some important ways a plus. 
She had broad experience in handling trade related matters. She was a 
key negotiator in Taiwan gaining membership in the World Trade Organ-
ization in 2002. She had also made fixing the economy a priority goal. 
She had spoken specifically of shifting the focus of economic planning 
from one driven by efficiency to an innovation driven one, which to most 
economists made sense. Finally, she sought to help small and medium-
sized businesses, which had resonance to many citizens.87
In mid-December, a well-known and respected magazine in Taiwan, 
CommonWealth, published a survey-based article that cited how the 
business community looked at the economy and the presidential candi-
dates. More than 80 percent of top executives were pessimistic about the 
economy in 2016 and said slower economic growth in China was the 
main reason. Most expected GDP growth to be less than two percent. 
They cited Taiwan’s exclusion from regional integration as a major prob-
lem. Also, over 30 percent of those interviewed said a lack of talent was 
an obstacle. 
The KMT’s platform for improving the economy focused mainly on 
promoting external commercial relations. However, in view of the state 
of the economy under KMT rule since 2008, especially if seen against 
President Ma’s early promises, the KMT was not able to generate much 
public confidence in its policies. Also, voters looked at other facts: Real 
wages had been stagnant for some time, public debt had increased, in-
bound investment slowed, problems facing Taiwan’s top export market 
 84.  “Taiwan export orders drop for 8th consecutive month,” Taiwan News, December 21, 
2015 (online at taiwannews.com.tw). 
 85.  George Liao, “Taiwan IPI down 7 consecutive months,” Taiwan News, December 23, 
2015 (online at taiwannews.com.tw). 
 86.  Paul Lin, “Beware of China’s economic invasion,” Taipei Times, December 23 2015 
(online at taipeitimes.com). 
 87.  “Taiwan Voters Want Government That Listens, Tsai Says,” BloombergBusiness, 
January 2, 2016 (online at bloomberg.com). 
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(China) caused consternation in the business community in Taiwan and 
most of all GDP growth during late 2015 and into 2016 was near zero.88
The DPP’s plan to invigorate the economy was based on expanding
social welfare, raising the minimum wage, and encouraging local innova-
tion. It was Keynesian in spirit, which had recently not worked well in 
improving the economies of Europe, Japan and the United States. The 
DPP also promoted joining the U.S. Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
agreement to increase trade.89 But, heading toward voting time the TPP 
had not been finalized and anyway Taiwan’s participation remained un-
certain. Still the DPP’s ideas had not been demonstrated not to work or 
not work as well as the KMT’s strategy, arguably giving Tsai and the 
DPP and advantage in terms of economic policy. 
The bottom line? The public believed a change in ruling parties 
would improve Taiwan’s economic fortunes. The main reasons were the 
widespread perception that the Ma administration did not care about the 
poor and the youth, slow growth produced even slower increases in in-
comes (an average of 2.3 percent GDP growth compared to a 1 percent 
rise in incomes), businesses had benefitted from ties with China but citi-
zens had not, and pension schemes and taxes were not handled fairly.90
Increasing housing prices that made some of Taiwan’s cities among the 
most expensive in the world relative to salaries also constituted a prob-
lem that hurt the KMT.91
IV.  DOMESTIC POLITICS AND ISSUES 
During the run-up to the 2016 election two major issues in domestic 
politics in Taiwan had special salience. Both affected other matters 
bringing some to the fore or sidelining others. Both were divisive. 
The first issue was Taiwan’s national identity, the essence of which 
is whether Taiwan should be regarded as separate from China (meaning 
independent), or part of China pending reunification.92 Since Taiwan al-
ready possesses most of the qualifications for statehood, this generally 
 88.  Ibid. 
 89.  Ibid. 
 90.  Benjamin Yeh, “Taiwanese voters bank on new leader to spur economy,” AFP, Janu-
ary 9, 2016 (online at afp.com). 
 91.  “A Tsai is just a Tsai,” Economist, January 9, 2016 (online at economist.com). A 
study published at this time showed that housing prices in Taipei since 2005 increased, relative 
to income, by a ratio of 8.9 to 15.7 in 2014—almost twice the level of London. 
 92.  For background, see Alan Wachman, Taiwan: National Identity and Democratization 
(Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1994). Wachman states that Taiwan’s national identity is founded 
on upheaval and dislocation and that most of the population identifies with either Taiwan or 
the mainland (p. 15). 
22 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES
referred to Taiwan’s future. Discussions about Taiwan’s identity and its 
sovereignty served to define both the political parties and voters’ views 
of candidates. 
The second issue was reform broadly defined.93 This included sys-
temic changes that were not accomplished in the past, but that should 
have been, plus some new issues of considerable import. A number of 
them related to the Constitution and/or the political system. Some were 
economic in nature, especially tax and welfare policies. 
These two issues connected closely to growing populism in Taiwan, 
which has for some time pervaded its politics, especially during election 
campaigns. In important ways populism was the common denominator. 
In most democracies populism is a positive force insofar as it 
frames issues for debate or creates new ones and increases public interest 
in the democratic processes. However, it is a negative in that it encour-
ages emotionalism as opposed to rational thinking and election strategists 
use it to find ways to make gains against other candidates or opposing 
parties based on prejudices and even hatred. It is also considered anti-
intellectual, xenophobic, and connected to the rise of fascism and com-
munism. Finally, it is a distraction from political and economic reform, 
and the tool of the opportunist turned tyrant. In recent years, the latter 
view has been more widely accepted even though populist appeals have 
become commonplace in democracies throughout the world.94
Taiwan’s populism is in a number of ways unique. It did not play an 
important role in Taiwan’s history or its politics until recent years, 
though it might have. For example, the potential (or demand at least) for 
popular government was brought to Taiwan by early immigrants that had 
abandoned Chinese elitism and admired individualism spawned by a 
“frontier mentality” (self-reliance, toughness, etc.), which had proven 
conducive to planting the seeds of democracy in other places.95 This, 
however, did not become a central part of the political culture in Taiwan 
due to the elitist nature of government during the period of Chinese rule 
(1683-1895). Similarly, Taiwan did not learn much about popular rule 
 93.  For reference, see Herman Halbeisen, “In Search of a New Political Order? Political 
Reform in Taiwan,” in Steve Tsang (ed.), In the Shadow of China: Political Developments in 
Taiwan since 1949 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1993) and Shelley Rigger, Politics
in Taiwan: Voting for Democracy (London: Routledge, 1999). 
 94.  Barbara Werner and Dwayne Woods (eds.), The Many Faces of Populism: Current 
Perspectives (Bradford, UK: Emerald, 2014). 
 95.  See Peng Ming-min, A Taste of Freedom: Memoirs of a Formosan Independence 
Leader (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972). 
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during the short period of democracy in Japan; rather the focus was on 
winning local representation and that was led by a local elite.96
CHIANG Kai-shek employed populist themes in advancing SUN 
Yat-sen’s mandate for making China a constitutional democracy and in 
his efforts to win favor and support in the West, especially the United 
States. He arranged local elections almost as soon as he moved his gov-
ernment to Taiwan. He promoted constitutionalism and a democratic 
form of government in Taiwan. Still his ruling circle was limited to a 
small “core group” of elitist officials (in a single party system). Finally, 
Chiang’s attentions were mainly on reforms of the KMT, the govern-
ment, and building a strong economy.97
CHIANG Ching-kuo (CCK), unlike his father, was a man of the 
people and aggressively promoted popular rule. But his approach was 
democratization by edict. Given the opposition to rapid democratization 
and peoples’ respect for CCK, commanding political modernization 
aimed toward implementing a democratic system was CCK’s most effec-
tive strategy. CCK also viewed democratic change as a means to realize 
reform, especially clean and honest government, and sustain economic 
growth. Very important he also saw it as a way to combat communism 
and win support abroad for Taiwan’s sovereignty at a time when it was 
under threat.98
LEE Teng-hui, CCK’s successor, learned from his predecessors. He 
found promoting popular rule and democracy enhanced his image and his 
authority to govern. He also discovered that in order to advance both 
democratization and reform it was convenient to exploit populist senti-
ments. But Lee was confronted by populist opposition politicians that 
challenged him to realize majority (meaning, Taiwanese, Taiwan’s larg-
est ethnic group) interests while those in his party wanted to advance 
SUN Yat-sen’s ideals. He had to maintain a balance. He was in many re-
spects an elitist; he was called an “authoritarian populist.”99
The advent of serious populism and it becoming the favored ap-
proach to attaining and wielding political power followed the founding of 
 96.  George H. Kerr, Formosa: Licensed Revolution and the Home Rule Movement, 1895-
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the Democratic Progressive Party in 1986 and even more with the elec-
tion of CHEN Shui-bian president in 2000. The DPP aggressively pro-
moted local nationalism without respect for minorities—mainstay traits 
of populism.100 Exploiting ethnic differences and provoking China re-
sulted in a loss of American support which along with his horrendous 
corruption caused the ruination of the Chen presidency and the demise of 
Chen’s populism with it.101
MA Ying-jeou was essentially an anti-populist president. He was a 
Confucian-style leader. He idealized the traditional Chinese ideals of 
moral and upright rule (which he contrasted to Chen’s corrupt regime) 
while condemning exploiting ethnic differences and ill will, local nation-
alism (that he equated to protectionism and isolationism), and emotional-
ism that he saw as tyranny of the majority. He viewed his governance as 
“enlightened and paternalistic.”102
President Ma’s approach to governance worked well while the 
memory of the failed Chen presidency remained an important element of 
the national psyche. But this faded. And Ma showed little appreciation 
for the reality that populism had become a part of Taiwan’s politics. In 
short, it was an effective tool that most politicians and political parties 
felt they could not abandon. Ma was different.103
In August 2009, Ma suffered a serious blow to his personal reputa-
tion and to the image of his administration as a result of Typhoon Mora-
kot. Morakot was a very severe storm even for Taiwan in terms of the 
destruction and loss of life it caused. Ma’s response was correct, if unfor-
tunate. Given Taiwan’s federal system the first responders should have 
been, and were, local governments. But because local action was not 
enough and there were delays caused by confusion over jurisdiction Citi-
 100.  See Antonio C. Hsiang and Jerome S. Hsiang, “Democratic Peace Across the Taiwan 
Strait,” in Sujian Guo and Banging Guo (eds.), Greater China in an Era of Globalization 
(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2000), pp. 100-02 and John F. Copper, Taiwan’s Democracy 
on Trial: Political Change During the Chen Shui-bian Era and Beyond (Lanham, MD: Uni-
versity Press of America, 2010, p. 59. 
 101.  Though it can be argued that populism does not grow in the milieu of an expanding 
middle class and absent unions and/or farmers organizing large groups of active supporters, 
Chen’s actions seem more the cause of populism being discredited. See Larry Diamond, The
Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies Throughout the World (New York: 
Holt Paperbacks, 2008), p. 98. 
 102.  John Fu-sheng Hsieh, “Taiwan in 2013: Stalemate at Home, Some Headway Abroad”
Asian Survey, January/February 2014, p. 149. 
 103.  Ku Er-teh, “Populism does Taiwan no favors,” Taipei Times, July 18, 2010 (online at 
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zens came to see the Ma administration’s response as inefficient and un-
caring, a view that Ma’s opposition happily fueled.104
Ma bounced back from this setback succored by a much improved 
economy, the multiple trials of CHEN Shui-bian (that kept his malfea-
sance, corruption, race baiting, and poisonous populism in the media), 
and applause from the United States for maintaining serenity in the Tai-
wan Strait helped Ma. 
The next year after Ma’s second presidential election victory, 2013, 
saw the opposition’s more frequent (and more successful) use of populist 
themes. Meanwhile, Ma was affected by the so-called second term curse 
and his and the KMT’s popularity, anyway not high, suffered.105 There 
was no palpable backlash caused by DPP politicians and/or the media 
advancing populist ideals, though they were said (by the business com-
munity) to hamper economic growth.106
The 2014 election campaign saw a steep rise of populist emotional-
ism manifested in street politics, demands for more economic fairness, 
appeals for equality and compassion, etc. This contributed to increased 
citizen participation, especially by younger citizens. But it also engen-
dered greater political polarization and caused the electorate to focus on 
style rather than substance in evaluating candidates. Reform as an ideal 
was center stage; but proposals for specific change were not while re-
forms were seldom framed in a way that made them actionable. In any 
event, populist emotions largely defined the election campaign.107
In the wake of the Nine-in-One election advancing populist themes 
were the DPP’s favored approach to the 2016 campaign. This made 
sense. Populism worked in 2014; it had even more resonance now to 
DPP (and new third parties) candidates running for office. DPP officials 
and candidates assailed the gap between rich and poor even though it was 
clear that the causes were mainly globalism and advances made in in-
formation technology and that regimes that acted to correct it elsewhere 
caused economic growth to slow down. In Taiwan’s case, egalitarian ap-
peals to correct wage inequities exacerbated the brain drain problem.108
But few connected the two. Populist politicians attacked the government 
 104.  See Copper, The KMT Returns to Power, p. 109. 
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for being too close to China and for “selling out” Taiwan, even though 
this was not just a Taiwan problem. Chinese tourists, it was alleged, en-
gaged in bad behavior and many were spies. 
The KMT had no effective contretemps to the various populist tac-
tics the DPP employed. The ruling party was in a funk. It had to deal 
with party disunity, halt members fleeing the party, find good candidates, 
and cope with a host of other problems. In short, the KMT had little 
choice but to play defense and it didn’t do that well. The opposition 
painted Ma and the KMT as elitist; they arguably were. The DPP’s in-
tended or declared candidates had an opening to exploit.109
But the situation did not totally a fit for the DPP. The DPP’s history 
is replete with elitism. It was a party of rural Taiwan; its supporters were 
less educated and less cosmopolitan. They had to be led. The DPP was 
also an ethnic party to a large degree. This was an obstacle to democracy, 
at least popular democracy.110 Finally, the DPP adopted the KMT’s or-
ganizational principles and structure. It is a Leninist party built on strong 
leadership that it found handy to cope with internal squabbles that often 
became a serious problem.111
Further, TSAI Ing-wen is not by nature a populist. She had even 
said so.112 By background she is an elitist. She grew up in a wealthy fam-
ily. She prefers to speak Mandarin, not Taiwanese (the language of the 
masses). She acquired a top-flight education in Taiwan and abroad, in-
cluding a master’s degree from a top U.S. university and a doctorate 
from one of England’s best. Her early experience in government was 
dealing with global issues, not local matters that her more provincial 
brethren worked with.113
During the campaign Tsai appeared to fully grasp the reality that 
playing the hate China card would damage Taiwan’s economy and that 
maintaining cordial relations with the U.S. was a sine quo non since the 
two were connected. She understood that Taiwan would not long exist 
without America’s support. Thus, she adopted a “maintain the status quo 
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policy” vis-à-vis China. This contradicted the populist views of the 
DPP’s base.114
Tsai consequently hedged her language. She stopped referring to 
Taiwan’s sovereignty separate from China and instead spoke of “popular 
sovereignty” as a product of democracy. Addressing Taiwan’s status she 
spoke of “safeguarding Taiwan’s future autonomy, its right to choose.” 
These were ideas that smelled like independence but did not frontally 
challenge China’s views on Taiwan, making it evident Tsai wanted rec-
onciliation with Beijing.115 She spoke in populist terms of cross-Strait re-
lations being formulated in accordance with the will of the people, but 
added, “whichever party was in power.” Clearly she was not basing her 
statements on the party’s 1991 Independence Clause, the 1999 Resolu-
tion on Taiwan’s Future, or the 2007 Normal Nation Resolution—all of 
which presumed Taiwan to be a sovereign, independent country separate 
from the People’s Republic of China.116
Meanwhile, Tsai could not allow her attention to be diverted by 
pursuing reform. She needed to win the election. Her party was of the 
same mind. Hence reform became pretty much a sideshow during the 
campaign with Tsai and her party posturing on reformist issues to their 
political advantage. This mimicked the 2014 election campaign. 
Meanwhile, Eric Chu, who was elected chairman of the KMT in the 
wake of the 2014 election, suggested a number of reforms. These includ-
ed shifting from a presidential (or a semi-presidential system as most 
called it) to a parliamentary one, introducing absentee voting, lowering 
the voting age to 18, reducing the requirement for a party to sponsor leg-
islators-at-large to just 3 percent of the vote, and reviewing the current 
electoral system.117
Changing Taiwan’s political system to a parliamentary one was the 
most serious of the reforms he broached. A parliamentary system is ar-
guably what the Constitution set forth, but was altered (or nullified) via 
the “Temporary Provisions” (of the Constitution) by CHIANG Kai-shek 
and also by practice.118 Most of the democracies in the world are parlia-
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mentary systems, including the Western European democracies and Ja-
pan. A parliamentary system would have precluded the extreme gridlock 
that characterized the CHEN Shui-bian presidency due to the presidency 
being in the hands of the DPP while the legislature was controlled by the 
KMT. It would dampen the current polarization in Taiwan politics and 
perhaps reduce the likelihood of divided government (including after this 
election).
But Chu’s proposal got short shrift. The reasons were that the KMT 
had overseen the evolution of a presidential system, most citizens felt 
that a strong leader was needed (and a presidential system was thus pref-
erable), and it was the system in use in the United States and was SUN 
Yat-sen’s model. Many felt that the issue had already been debated suffi-
ciently and that further discussion would only revisit already decided is-
sues (during national conferences held on political/constitutional issues 
during the 1990s).119 Finally, DPP leaders favored a presidential system. 
They perceived that the president represented the entire people and based 
on their support among Taiwan’s largest ethnic group they had an ad-
vantage. Some also perceived that Mainland Chinese favored a parlia-
mentary system because “they did not want Taiwanese to seize pow-
er.”120 Finally, the DPP was confident their candidate would win in 
January; so why dilute the power of the executive branch of government? 
Another issue that Chu broached was the matter of absentee voting. 
Seeing the number of voters that returned from China to vote in 2008 
(and most voted KMT) and the fact that most democracies in the world 
had a provision for absentee voting, plus it represented furthering the 
process of democratization in Taiwan, KMT officials talked about it dur-
ing the 2010 election campaign for metropolitan city and other local of-
fices.121 But nothing was done. It was brought up at other times; but it 
never became a serious or popular issue. Thus, neither the KMT nor the 
DPP gave it much support when Chu proposed it.122
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The other reforms Chu proposed did not gain any traction either. 
The DPP agreed with his suggestion that the age for voting be lowered to 
18; but DPP leaders appeared to want to make this their own issue later 
rather than cooperate with the KMT to put it into effect now. The DPP 
showed little or no interest in other “hoped for” reforms. They focused 
on the campaign and winning the election. The atmosphere was one of 
competition not cooperation. 
In October, shortly after Chu became the KMT’s candidate for pres-
ident he proposed some ideas for legislative reform. Chu called for a 
more neutral speaker, more transparency, and a “State of the Union” ad-
dress to the legislature each year. He also suggested more openness in 
meetings between the various caucuses to avoid the appearance of “black 
box” deals. Finally, Chu recommended an end to term limits and abolish-
ing the KMT’s rule that the speaker cannot run for election as an at-large
candidate—both of which appeared designed as a sop to WANG Jin-
pyng.123
While talking of reform, Chu also criticized the DPP for its boycotts 
and it disrupting legislative sessions.124 This was not conducive to bipar-
tisanship, if there was any of that around. Chu probably knew the DPP 
would not help him push any of his reforms, but he proposed them any-
way to help unify his party and put the DPP on the defensive. 
As voting day got closer there was more talk of reform. But this was 
mostly vague campaign rhetoric. Chu still did not win any support from 
the DPP for his proposals. Many KMT candidates regarded his proposals 
as too late or not effective campaign issues. 
TSAI Ing-wen, not wanting to be upstaged by Chu even though his 
proposals found little support, issued a statement of her reforms—five of 
them: generational justice (focusing on the dire situation facing the 
youth), improving government institutions (noting the current lack of ef-
fective communications with the people), “fixing” the legislature (argu-
ing it was not representative), transitional justice (looking at rectifying 
past regimes’ transgressions), and making reforms (to deal with social 
antagonisms and political fighting).125 Tsai’s proposals, coming less than 
four months before the election, had to be seen as campaigning or ideas 
was another factor: Chu had lost on the issue of adopting a parliamentary system and this 
weakened his other reform proposals. 
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to take up once she was president—not proposals to act upon immediate-
ly.
In conclusion, the national identity or sovereignty issue and pro-
posals for reform were mutually at odds. Functionally the two could not 
work in tandem. During the campaign the former gained greater reso-
nance, to the disadvantage of the latter. Finally, one of the problems with 
populism is that it succeeds when the public thinks its political favorites 
are doing what works, not what actually works.126 The pursuit of inde-
pendence (as will seen below) fit this description. 
V.   THE CHINA FACTOR 
The People’s Republic of China, referred to here as just China, is 
one of two countries (the other being the United States) that impact Tai-
wan’s politics and its elections. The point is that what China does and 
what its leaders say influence Taiwan’s voters.
To fully understand the “China factor” it is necessary to understand 
Chinese leaders’ thinking and China’s policy vis-à-vis Taiwan. At the 
heart of China’s relationship with Taiwan is that China regards Taiwan 
as its territory and recovering it is a “core interest” (meaning one it is 
willing to use force to realize).127 In recent years, meaning for a couple of 
decades, China’s specific policy tenets have been quite consistent: ad-
vance unification under the “one country, two systems” formula and em-
ploy military force if Taiwan declares independence.128
On the other hand Chinese leaders are arguably not in a big rush to 
bring Taiwan under their control. Evidence of this is in the fact that Bei-
jing’s main tactic is promoting commercial ties with Taiwan so as to in-
tegrate the two side’s economies, which it perceives will lead to advanc-
ing other ties. 
China’s policy toward Taiwan has also been described as “conces-
sionary.” Specifically China offered trade favors to Taiwan and provided 
profitable opportunities to Taiwan businesses operating in or investing in 
China. And that has produced results: Nearly ten percent of Taiwan’s 
workforce is in China, almost two-thirds of its investment goes there, and 
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40 percent of its exports are China bound.129 All of this has significantly 
helped Taiwan’s economy. In fact, Chinese leaders want it to be known 
that there exists an asymmetric dependency relationship that would hurt 
Taiwan to break.130
The Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement concluded in 
2010 was a centerpiece of this policy. Western analysts reported that it 
would raise Taiwan’s gross domestic product by 5.3 percent above the 
previous trend line.131 The agreement also increased Taiwan’s agricultur-
al exports to China by 33 percent in the first half of 2011.132 Meanwhile, 
Chinese tourists increased in number from 300,000 when MA Ying-jeou 
became president to an estimated 2.3 million in 2012 and became a ma-
jor engine of job creation. In the first half of 2015 more than 2.5 million 
tourists from China visited Taiwan—55 percent of Taiwan’s total.133
Beijing has indeed sought to make Taiwan dependent on China 
economically. But to a considerable extent it has created the same rela-
tionship with a host of countries around the world. This is the product of 
growing trade and other interconnectedness in a globalizing world and 
China becoming an economic powerhouse.134
China has also pursued a policy of isolating Taiwan diplomatically. 
It has kept Taiwan from participating in international organizations and 
has reduced its diplomatic partners to a small number. By 2008, Beijing 
had defeated Taiwan in their foreign aid and investment “war” and then 
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agreed on a truce.135 China has also stopped taking Taiwan’s diplomatic 
partners and has allowed Taipei to join some important international or-
ganizations. Basically, during the Ma presidency, China halted its efforts 
to reduce Taiwan’s “international space.”
Will this continue? Perhaps. But Tsai and the DPP have to consider 
that China’s generosity might be reduced or even terminated and reckon 
with the possibility that Beijing might revert to its former strategy of iso-
lating Taiwan if Tsai repudiates the 1992 Consensus or the one-China 
principle. In fact, it has been estimated (in Taiwan) that Taipei might 
promptly lose 10 or more of the 22 nations with whom it has formal dip-
lomatic ties.136
Finally, Beijing embraces a strategy of intimidating Taiwan with its 
growing military strength. Again Taiwan is not singled out: China has 
been increasing its defense budget by around double-digits every year for 
three and a half decades, affecting most of the world. On the other hand, 
China’s short-range missiles and its amphibious attack capabilities have 
special application vis-à-vis Taiwan and both have grown in numbers 
markedly in recent years. The former has been called a “sword of Damo-
cles” hanging over Taiwan’s head, meaning that Taipei’s air and naval 
capabilities would be eliminated in a first strike and Taiwan’s missile de-
fenses would be unable to prevent this.137 China has also upgraded its 
navy with an aircraft carrier (and more on the way) and landing craft. 
The “Taiwan issue” must also be viewed in the light of China’s am-
bitions to be a global power and perhaps eventually to rule the world. 
One might presume that Taiwan is an initial stepping-stone in this strate-
gy and therefore Chinese leaders view its reunification as a top priority. 
However, there are reasons to think otherwise. If China is successful in 
becoming a first rate world power or more, Taiwan will likely not be an 
obstacle; it will want to have cordial relations with China and may even 
seek to become part of China. Second, looking at what China fears, an 
increase in Japanese influence in Taiwan, the U.S. reversing its one-
China policy, or a formal declaration of independence by the government 
in Taiwan, currently none of these seems likely. Thus, it is reasonable to 
think Chinese leaders want to avoid turning the Taiwan issue into a cri-
sis.138
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It is also important to grasp the fact that Chinese leaders were aware 
of the Ma administration’s failings. They realized that Ma was unpopular 
due to his poor handling domestic problems, the fact former president 
CHEN Shui-bian’s divide (along ethnic lines) and conquer governance 
and his rampant corruption had faded from the public mind, and the 
growth of populism began to play a much bigger role in Taiwan’s poli-
tics (advantage to the opposition). Chinese leaders likewise understood 
Ma was perceived as overreaching in advancing closer cross-Strait rela-
tions. Finally, Beijing was attuned to the fact that the trade and other 
“goodies” China provided Taiwan were unpopular in China and granting 
them were not seen as that productive in changing minds in Taiwan.139
Thus, in the last two or so years, Beijing did not increase the “aid” it 
provided Taiwan. Cutting back was also caused by its own economy 
slowing and its companies increasingly competing with those in Taiwan. 
This came at a bad time for Taiwan. Combined with efforts by the oppo-
sition to portray Taiwan’s connections with China as less beneficial than 
President Ma and the KMT said and, furthermore, dangerous inasmuch 
as they undermine Taiwan’s sovereignty, the electorate became increas-
ingly uneasy about the relationship.140
Before the 2014 election campaign ended, opposition leaders de-
clared that China would have to make compromises and deal with the 
DPP if the DPP won. Beijing, however, gave no indication that it agreed 
with this; on the contrary, it rejected the idea.141 President Xi even said 
that the “Taiwan issue” could not remain indefinitely unresolved.142 After 
winning the election DPP stalwarts stuck to their position, often in even 
stronger terms. Again Chinese leaders’ response was negative. In fact, 
there was near “unanimity” among foreign China experts that Beijing 
stance would be harsh and even punishing if the DPP rejected “one Chi-
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na” or aggressively promoted independence.143 It appeared Beijing had 
“drawn a line in the sand.”
In March, at the annual meeting of China’s National People’s Con-
gress, President XI Jinping stated that the 1992 Consensus was the 
“foundation” for cross-strait relations and warned that rejecting it might 
create a “state of turbulence.” At the end of the month, China announced 
that it had approved 57 nations as founding members of its vaunted 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), but Taiwan’s application 
was not accepted. China’s Taiwan Affairs Office said that Taiwan would 
be welcome “under a different name.” It was reported elsewhere that 
Beijing was taking a “wait and see” position in view of the likelihood 
TSAI Ing-wen would win the January 2016 election.144
In mid-April, when TSAI Ing-wen was about to be formally chosen 
the DPP’s presidential candidate, a spokesman for the Taiwan Affairs 
Office in Beijing stated on three separate occasions China’s view on 
Taiwan: that the peaceful development of cross-strait relations depended 
on “holding firm” to the 1992 consensus and opposing Taiwan independ-
ence. He condemned what he called the “splittist” position of “one coun-
try on each side” (of the Taiwan Strait) advanced by the DPP.145
Upon receiving her party’s nomination, Chairwoman Tsai an-
nounced her policy toward China would be one of keeping the status 
quo. Beijing reacted by stating that the “anchor” of cross-Strait relations 
must be based on the understanding that “the mainland and Taiwan both 
belong to China.” Chinese leaders also publically recalled that she said in 
July leading up to the 2014 election that if the DPP wins the 2016 elec-
tion China “will adjust its cross-strait policy in favor of the direction of 
the DPP.” They strongly pooh-poohed this idea.146
Tsai’s cross-Strait policy faced another hard reality. Frank Hsieh, 
former party chairman and the DPP’s presidential candidate in 2008, led 
a faction of the party that advocates engaging with China more actively. 
In addition, some of Taiwan’s mayors, notably Taipei Mayor Ko, were 
dealing with China on their own. So were a number of DPP local offi-
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cials.147 There was likewise a realization in Taiwan that the United States 
did not support Taiwan’s independence; thus to pursue a “separation” 
policy would make Taiwan an “orphan” in the international communi-
ty.148 Some party members even stated that the DPP had to abandon the 
goal of formal independence lest cross-Strait relations become destabi-
lized.149
On her other flank hard-line DPP members assailed Tsai’s policy as 
contrary to party doctrine. SHIH Ming-teh, a former chairman of the 
DPP, accused Tsai of “waffling” and assailed her “pandering to the 
wealthy that favor better relations with China.”150 Later Shih said dispar-
agingly, regarding her status quo policy, that Tsai was the “female ver-
sion of MA Ying-jeou.”151 Another former chairman, LIN Yi-hsiung, 
asked sarcastically about the status quo: “Can someone running for the 
presidency leave the nation’s prospects up in the air?” Well-known Tai-
wan independence advocate, KOO Kwang-ming, said Tsai’s status quo 
policy would be a “fatal wound to the nation.”152
Tsai was relieved to a considerable degree when attacks on her sta-
tus quo policy abated after KMT chairman Eric Chu shortly after this 
made a trip to China. Chairman Chu’s meeting with President (and 
chairman of the Chinese Communist Party) XI Jinping was technically 
unofficial since the two met as heads of their respective parties. Never-
theless, it was considered an important meeting and it was given exten-
sive press coverage in Taiwan.153 DPP stalwarts went on the offense and 
made Chu and the KMT’s “pro-China policies” their targets.
In any event, Xi used the visit as an opportunity to restate and even 
elaborate on China’s Taiwan policy. In particular he spoke of the sine
quo non nature of adhering to the 1992 Consensus and opposing inde-
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pendence. China’s official news agency, Xinhua, referred with some 
alarm to an “important new juncture” in cross-Strait relations.154
Subsequently President Xi said he welcomed Taiwan joining Chi-
na’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. But he also reiterated an ear-
lier statement to the effect that if there is a failure to accept the “founda-
tion of relations,” namely one-China and the 1992 Consensus, “the earth 
will move and the mountains will shake (which many in Taiwan took to 
be an unveiled threat).155 SUN Yafu, vice chairman of the Association 
for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait, added that issues relating to for-
eign affairs would be “hard to handle.” He also asserted that benefits 
Taiwan had accrued from trade and investments with China, not to men-
tion its participation in regional economic activities, required “compati-
ble” cross-Strait relations.156
After Chu’s China visit, DPP candidate TSAI Ing-wen made a trip 
to the United States. China said little—probably because Tsai did not 
bring up the issue of one-China or the 1992 consensus and only obliquely 
touched on the matter of Taiwan’s sovereignty. Probably the Chinese 
leadership also wanted to gauge Washington’s response to the trip.
On the other hand, just prior to Tsai’s trip, during a visit by Presi-
dent Xi to Belarus, Chinese negotiators put a provision in a joint com-
muniqué saying that China opposed Taiwan joining any international or 
regional organization that requires statehood and condemned foreign 
arms sales to Taiwan. This was already China’s policy; but it had not 
been stated in such a formal way for some time. Beijing also sent Taiwan 
signals by arranging talks with the Pope in late December (hinting of es-
tablishing relations with Taiwan’s only diplomatic partner in Europe) 
and finalizing a free trade agreement with South Korea.157
After Tsai’s trip to the U.S., ZHANG Zhijun, director of China’s 
Taiwan Affairs Office, reiterated President Xi’s earlier statement that re-
lations were at an historic stage. He declared that Taiwan had accrued 
important economic benefits from its relationship with China “as a result 
of the 92 Consensus.” Zhang spoke of a vision of greater peace and sta-
bility, regional cooperation, and Taiwan’s participation in international 
 154.  Romberg, “Squaring the Circle,” pp. 6-7. 
 155.  Ibid., pp. 7-8. 
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organizations and events; but he also cited “consequences” if a new ad-
ministration in Taiwan failed to embrace “one China.”158
In early November, unexpectedly to almost everyone in Taiwan, the 
government announced that in a few days President Ma would meet Chi-
na’s President XI Jinping in Singapore. Top leaders of the two sides had 
not met since the Nationalist government fled to Taiwan in 1949. Fur-
thermore, President Ma had hoped to meet with President Xi for some 
time, but that had not happened.159
The meeting was informal. No document resulted as none was ex-
pected. President Xi’s objective was ostensibly to draw attention to the 
Ma’s administration’s successful cross-Strait policy and obligate TSAI 
Ing-wen (assuming she would win election to the presidency in January) 
to adhere to the tenets of that policy inasmuch as she had promised to 
maintain the status quo.160
Tsai and the DPP contended that President Ma’s intention was to 
improve his deficient legacy and impact the coming election. Ma said his 
purpose was to maintain cross-Strait comity and improve the chances for 
peace in the region. DPP leaders retorted Ma should have not made the 
trip since he is about to leave the presidency, that Ma failed to bring up 
the issue of China’s missiles aimed at Taiwan, and that the content of the 
visit did not mirror mainstream public opinion in Taiwan. Tsai criticized 
Ma for not referencing Taiwan’s democracy and said she would win the 
election notwithstanding the visit.161
After the meeting, it was apparent that the Xi-Ma (Ma-Xi in Tai-
wan) meeting would not affect the election outcome, the presidential part 
of it at least. (The evidence was less clear about the legislative contest.) 
Tsai held onto a healthy lead in the polls in the wake of the meeting.162
During a presidential debate in late December, TSAI Ing-wen stated 
that the 92 Consensus “is an option, but is not the only one.” She also 
called on Beijing to respect Taiwan’s democratic way of life.163 China’s 
reaction was quit caustic. MA Xiaoguang, head of China’s Taiwan Af-
fairs Office, replied that the 92 Consensus was a “core concept that could 
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not be questioned.” He went on to say that without it the “institutional-
ized cross-strait dialog mechanism will be affected and could even col-
lapse.”164
In the immediate run-up to the election, Tsai made some conces-
sionary comments aimed at Beijing. She restated that her status quo poli-
cy was one of not provoking China. (See below for details on this point.) 
She stated that in Hong Kong in 1992 Taipei and Beijing agreed that they 
should set aside differences and that “everyone has a different view on 
how to interpret that part of history or how to term it.” She also said that 
after the election she did not rule out high-level cross-Strait contacts, 
would not cut the number of independent Chinese tourists, and supported 
inclusion of Chinese students in Taiwan in the National Health Insurance 
program. Beijing stuck to its position on the 92 Consensus and one-
China, but did not make any new or particularly hostile statements about 
Tsai or the DPP.165
In the last few days before January 16, Beijing issued no hostile 
proclamations toward Tsai or the DPP and did not take any overt actions 
to try to influence the voting. Chinese leaders had obviously concluded 
Chu and the KMT had little hope of winning and seemed satisfied that 
Tsai would not adopt policies that required China to take immediate 
drastic measures in response. They appeared to assume that they could 
deal with provocations. In fact, some may have perceived that Tsai and 
the DPP winning the election may be a good thing inasmuch as if they 
did not pursue independence with any verve, since no one else of conse-
quence would, the issue may die. 
VI.   THE U.S. FACTOR 
Taiwan’s relations with the United States showed marked im-
provements during the months leading up to the election. The change 
was evidenced by the number of U.S. officials visiting Taiwan and the 
general tenor of the statements emanating from Washington about Tai-
wan. More importantly, America’s official stance toward TSAI Ing-wen
and the DPP shifted markedly. This evoked some important questions. 
Would this trend continue? How far would it go? How would it impact 
the election? 
During the LEE Teng-hui presidency (1988 to 2000) and even more 
so during the CHEN Shui-bian presidency (2000 to 2008), U.S. officials 
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opposed the Taiwan government’s provoking China and/or otherwise 
“upsetting the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.” Washington’s criticism of 
President Chen at times was especially strident, and was intended to 
show its serious displeasure with Chen’s inciting tensions with China at a 
time when the U.S. was enmeshed in a war on terrorism. Washington 
concluded that Chen was not a loyal U.S. ally.166
This situation changed in early 2008 with the KMT’s legislative 
election win and MA Ying-jeou’s victory in the presidential contest two 
months later. During these elections as well as the 2012 joint national 
election it was obvious that the U.S. favored Ma and the KMT. Putting 
this on display again, in the throes of the 2012 election campaign when 
TSAI Ing-wen visited the U.S. as the DPP’s presidential candidate the 
Obama administration treated her coldly.167 The U.S. even “interfered” in 
the 2012 election campaign when a former U.S. official in charge of 
U.S.-Taiwan relations visited Taiwan and publically spoke out against 
Tsai and the DPP.168
During the campaign leading up to the Nine-in-One election it was 
obvious nothing had changed. Credible sources even reported that the 
U.S. would favor the KMT in the 2016 election due to on-going doubts 
about DPP policies that “did not accord with U.S. national interests.”169
Richard Bush, director of the Center for East Asia Policy at the 
Bookings Institution and former head of the American Institute in Tai-
wan, counseled Taiwan that China could “overreact” to a Tsai victory in 
2016. He further stated that China had significantly improved its military 
capabilities to deal with Taiwan and that it would be difficult for Taiwan 
to defend itself “while America’s will and policies were in doubt.”170
In March, former Managing Director of the American Institute in 
Taiwan (Washington’s representative office in Taipei), Barbara Schrage, 
stated that the DPP should clarify its China policy before the coming 
election, to deal with “public skepticism,” and it should not “evade” the 
1992 consensus.171 DPP leaders were obviously unhappy. One of the 
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DPP’s supporting newspapers quipped that the U.S. should regard Tsai 
as a U.S. partner, not a “wayward student.”172
But there soon appeared evidence of an important turn in U.S. Tai-
wan policy. This was especially poignant given its context. When Barack 
Obama assumed the presidency he sought to avoid what he called zero-
sum thinking in U.S.-China relations and welcomed China’s rise.173 Dur-
ing the new president’s first trip to China, he concurred with the Chinese 
leaders’ position that Taiwan is one of China’s “core interest” (a matter 
over which China would engage its military).174 Shortly after this, a spate 
of statements and articles emanating from Obama supporters, primarily 
scholars, the media, and even former and current military brass, suggest-
ed that the U.S. should abandon Taiwan (because it was the only obstacle 
to better relations with China, it could not be defended easily, and that 
the U.S. public did not favor spilling the blood of American soldiers to 
protect Taiwan).175 But then this changed. 
The turnaround in U.S. China/Taiwan policy began in 2011 after 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced the U.S. pivot to Asia. By 
2013 it had noticeably affected U.S.-Taiwan relations.176 There was no 
more talk, directly or indirectly, from the Obama administration to the 
effect that Washington should ditch Taiwan. It also appeared, judging 
from more attention the Obama administration gave Taiwan, officials 
visiting Taiwan, and some subtle policy or policy related statements, that 
Washington now saw Taiwan and the DPP in a different light. However, 
U.S.’s Taiwan policy to a large extent was being made in secret and it 
had not (yet at least) become a means of leverage against China.177 In 
other words, it appeared the U.S. was heading in a new direction on rela-
tions with Taiwan but was treading lightly and carefully. 
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But soon there were better “indications” that the U.S.’ Taiwan poli-
cy had “made a change” such that Taiwan might become part of the Asia 
pivot (now called rebalance). Official Washington proffered its view 
about the “nine dashed line” that Beijing used to delineate its territorial 
claims in the South China Sea (that Nationalist China had drawn in the 
1940s): that Taipei should reevaluate it—apparently to justify America’s 
confrontation with China over Beijing’s claims.178 But most importantly, 
U.S. officials responded in a positive manner to Tsai’s “maintaining the 
status quo” China policy.179
In early May, U.S.-China friction over China’s military presence 
and its land reclamation activities in the South China Sea escalated. The 
U.S. dispatched the USS Fort Worth, one of the most advanced ships in 
the fleet, to patrol in the area surrounding the Spratly Islands. Subse-
quently rumors spread to the effect the U.S. might escalate the conflict if 
China established an air defense identification zone there. Thus the nine-
dash line came into play as a frame of reference to deal with a potential 
flashpoint that some opined might trigger a war.180
Following this a number of U.S. officials visited Taiwan, some 
making comments touching on U.S. strategic cooperation with Taipei. 
Raymond Burghardt, chairman of the Board of Trustees of the American 
Institute in Taiwan (which manages U.S. relations with Taiwan) and 
former director of the AIT office in Taipei, made a six-day visit to Tai-
wan. He cited improved relations with Taiwan and mentioned arms sales 
and Taiwan’s inclusion in America’s visa waver program. In response,
Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spoke of the “best U.S.-Taiwan re-
lations in 36 years.”181 At this time President Ma proposed his South 
China Sea Initiative that called on involved parties to focus on develop-
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ing resources and delaying any moves to resolve sovereignty issues.182
Washington praised President Ma’s proposal.183
Additional evidence of improved ties with Taiwan included backing 
Taipei to participate in the U.S.-sponsored Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement, support for Taiwan to join Interpol, and a Congressional 
proposal on military cooperation.184 U.S. Secretary of State Kerry even 
described Taiwan as a “fundamental element” in the Obama administra-
tion’s Asia pivot.185 Ben Bernanke visited Taiwan, the first former 
chairman of the Federal Reserve to do so. And Charles Rivkin, U.S. as-
sistant secretary of state for economic affairs, made a trip to Taiwan. 
Rivkin praised President Ma’s South China Sea peace initiative.186 In the 
meantime, the Department of State published a “comprehensive report” 
on the U.S.’ Taiwan policy, which Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 
for Asian and Pacific Affairs, Susan Thornton, said characterized Taiwan 
as a U.S. partner with whom Washington has “friendly and intimate rela-
tions.”187
While President Ma and the KMT could take credit for a warming 
of relations with the United States since they had overseen close ties with 
Washington, what was subsequently called by some the “U.S. Taiwan 
diplomatic offensive” seemed motivated by America’s anti-China policy 
shift and that played well for the DPP. The State Department’s polite 
tone expressed in advance of TSAI Ing-wen’s visit to the U.S. confirmed 
this.188
With warming relations as a backdrop, on May 30, Tsai embarked 
on a 12-day trip to the U.S. She visited six U.S. cities (Los Angeles, Chi-
cago, New York, Washington, DC, Houston and San Francisco) and met 
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with Taiwan support groups, local think tanks, and other organizations.189
Her advance team labeled the trip the “Light up Taiwan U.S. Campaign 
Tour.” Most critical to the success of her trip Tsai promoted her status 
quo policy on cross-Strait relations and advanced what was called a “four 
pronged foreign policy”: broadening cooperation with the United States, 
participating in projects benefiting the international community, protect-
ing Taiwan’s economic autonomy through trade diversification, and en-
hancing “principled cooperation” with China.190
Tsai received an unprecedented welcome in Washington from the 
Department of State and the White House. Tsai met with Evan Medeiros 
(who was known as a top Obama administration official not friendly to-
ward Taiwan) in the White House—constituting the first such visit of a 
presidential candidate from Taiwan. Following this she went to the De-
partment of State to meet with Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blink-
en—marking the first time a Taiwan candidate for president visited the 
building. All of her meetings were characterized as friendly and con-
structive.
All of this clearly mirrored a new and distinctly different official at-
titude toward Taiwan—in particular the DPP—in Washington.191 Several 
explanations were offered. One was that the White House recognized 
that Tsai was likely to win the presidential election in January 2016 and 
the U.S. needed to prepare to deal with her and the DPP. Two, Tsai’s 
“status quo policy” toward China convinced American foreign policy 
makers that she would not be a troublemaker as former president Chen 
had been. Three, there was a new realization by the administration that 
Taiwan was important to the U.S. Four, U.S. relations with China had 
deteriorated seriously and the Obama administration sought to respond 
and even vent its anger toward Beijing by adopting a friendly policy to-
ward Taiwan.192
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In any event Tsai’s trip constituted a big positive step forward in her 
bid for the presidency. After she returned to Taiwan, an opinion poll 
conducted by the Taiwan Brain Trust confirmed that her trip was well 
received at home and boosted her bid for the presidency. More than 60 
percent of those queried said they were satisfied with her performance in 
the U.S. and more than 70 percent thought it would contribute to her 
presidential bid. Also more than 70 percent agreed with her “status quo” 
policy. The same survey put her well ahead of all of the KMT’s possible 
candidates for the presidency.193
However, Tsai’s U.S. visit also exposed some nettlesome questions. 
Some of the pundits at think tanks in Washington were quick to point out 
Tsai’s status quo policy did not comport with the independence position
held by many in her party and most DPP voters.194 How would she rec-
oncile this?195
The conclusion reached by many observers was that there was no 
denying there had been a tectonic shift in the official U.S. stance toward 
Tsai and the DPP. Still Tsai had to assume that the U.S. “change of 
heart” toward her and the DPP had to be cultivated. In fact, notwithstand-
ing her favorable treatment in Washington, State Department officials 
said, at the end of Tsai’s visit, that U.S. policy had not changed.196 Final-
ly, many U.S. foreign policy making officials made it known they liked 
President Ma. One might conclude from all of this the makers of U.S. 
China/Taiwan policy had taken a new look at Tsai and the DPP, but cau-
tiously so. Tsai thus had a job to do in keeping the U.S. on her side. 
Yet perhaps the best way to explain the new U.S. Taiwan policy 
was that hostility toward China was fast on the upswing. The U.S. con-
demned China’s actions in the South China Sea and assailed China for 
alleged cyber attacks on U.S. government personnel files. At this time 
the Council on Foreign Relations, known to have close ties with policy 
makers in Washington, issued a special report entitled “Revising U.S. 
Grand Strategy Toward China.” The authors cited the need to “limit the 
dangers that China’s economic and military expansion pose to U.S. inter-
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ests in Asia and globally.” They recommended “less hedging and more 
active countering.”197 In any case, the deterioration in U.S.-China rela-
tions worked to the benefit of Taiwan, especially Tsai and the DPP. 
There was even some talk to the effect that the U.S. might play the 
“Taiwan card.” While this term was not mentioned in the current context, 
it had been in the past—during the face-off between the U.S. and China 
over Taiwan in 1996.198 It was also cited more recently, in 2012 at time 
the Obama Administration began to adopt a more hostile China policy.199
On the other hand, there were strong voices in the U.S. that argued 
China was important to America and the two had to cooperate to keep 
the global financial system stable, deal with such issues as nuclear prolif-
eration, terrorism, and global warming. Individuals that had been or still 
were close to the Obama administration expressed these views quite 
openly.200
In addition, not long after Tsai’s trip to the United States, amidst 
what otherwise appeared to be a serious souring of U.S.-China relations, 
President Obama suggested that some of China’s claims in the South 
China Sea might be legitimate.201 After the U.S. deal with Iran was final-
ized that would limit work on the latter’s nuclear weapons program, 
President Obama telephoned President Xi to thank him for his help.202 In 
late July, Admiral Scott Swift, while in Tokyo stated that it was crucial 
for the United States to deepen ties with China notwithstanding tensions 
in the East China Sea and the South China Sea.203
President Ma visited the United States at this time and spoke at his 
alma mater, Harvard University. U.S. officials praised Ma in language 
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they did not employ to laud Tsai.204 Later, with the election just a month 
away, U.S. officials applauded President Ma’s fisheries agreement 
signed with the Philippines, saying Ma is “solving problems.”205 Shortly 
after this several members of Congress hailed Ma’s South China Sea ini-
tiatives.206
In November, KMT Chairman Eric Chu embarked on a seven-day 
visit to the United States. This was his first U.S. visit as KMT chairman 
and presidential candidate. His itinerary included talking with academics 
at the Brookings Institution, interviewing with the Washington Post, at-
tending a welcome party at the Twin Oaks Estate, meeting with the Na-
tional Committee on American Foreign Policy, and speaking on Voice of 
America.207 He also called on officials at the Department of State, the 
National Security Council, the Department of Defense, and the Office of 
the United States Trade Representative. Chu met with more and higher 
officials than Tsai Ing-wen when she visited.208 The media described 
Chu’s visit as important, yet not all of the details were disclosed, leading 
to some speculation that some very confidential issues were discussed.209
Subsequently the White House and the Department of State stated it 
gave equal status to Tsai and Chu and that it would not interfere in the 
coming election.210 Given that the U.S. had previously favored the KMT, 
this was a significant change in policy. 
On December 16, the Obama administration announced a new arms 
sales package to Taiwan worth $1.83 billion. Coming before the election 
and far from the end of Obama’s term in office, the sale was seen by 
some observers as both trying to provoke China and helping Tsai Ing-
wen and the DPP.211 Others said it was a win for the Ma administration, 
noting that total U.S. sales amounted to $20 billion and that translated 
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into an average of $2.5 billion per year compared to $1.35 when LEE 
Teng-hui was president and $1.05 during the CHEN Shui-bian years.212
However, U.S. other foreign analysts gave a different interpretation 
to the sale. The authors of a piece in the Wall Street Journal noted that 
the sale broke a hiatus of four years (the longest gap in weapons sales to 
Taiwan since the Taiwan Relations Act was passed in 1979) and did not 
include cutting edge weapons (such as a more advanced version of the F-
16 fighter and help getting submarines as was promised in 2001); they 
concluded that the Obama administration had decided to exclude Taiwan 
from the U.S. Asian pivot.213
Two U.S. military/strategic policy experts wrote elsewhere that the 
arms package did not contain any high priority items for Taiwan and 
consideration of the next generation weapons would have to wait for the 
next U.S. administration in 2017 at the earliest. In the context of China’s 
growing capabilities, including a marked increase in the number of short-
range missiles it has aimed at Taiwan, they concluded the sale “fails to 
reflect the growing importance of Taiwan to U.S. strategy in Asia.214
Still, in the few weeks ahead of voting day in Taiwan Chairwoman 
Tsai and the DPP had reason to be optimistic about their connections 
with the U.S. At minimum they had good reason to expect Washington’s 
neutrality during the last days of the campaign. From Washington’s per-
spective much depended on the course of U.S.-China relations and how 
Tsai managed cross-Strait relations leading up to January 16 and after-
wards. 
VII.   THE CANDIDATES AND THE CAMPAIGN 
In the immediate wake of the 2014 Nine-in-One election, Taiwan’s 
two main parties set to work to pick their candidates for president, vice 
president, and the legislature (all seats being in contention). Selecting a 
presidential candidate was the first order of business. As it turned out, for 
the DPP this was an easy task; for the KMT it was not. 
In mid-February, TSAI Ing-wen, announced she would put her 
name forward in the party’s primary. Tsai spoke of her taking over the 
party’s leadership in 2008 when the party’s future looked dim, after 
which she quickly created a positive outlook among party members, and 
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the DPP, under her leadership, won some election victories. She cited her 
resumption of the party’s leadership again in 2014. Tsai alluded to her 
dream for Taiwan. She touted launching an “era of new politics” mean-
ing transparency and honesty, greater public participation, tolerance, a 
clear division of power and responsibility, and protection of the national 
sovereignty that she said had suffered during the Ma presidency.215
At this juncture Tainan Mayor William Lai, who had been men-
tioned as a possible candidate, announced that he was not running. Tsai’s 
nomination thus went unchallenged with a few caveats: Lai was support-
ed by former presidential advisor KOO Kwang-ming and some other 
DPP stalwarts, including veteran DPP member HUANG Yung-tien and 
Kaohsiung Mayor CHEN Chu. They voiced concern that Tsai had lost 
two major election contests (the race for New Taipei City major in 2010 
and the presidential election in 2012). Also, she was weak on the issue of 
Taiwan’s independence.216
But very quickly opposition to Tsai faded and she became the 
standard bearer of the DPP that was unified behind her and determined to 
win the election. She also garnered support among some other opposition 
parties and various social and civic groups. 
The KMT’s “natural” candidate was Eric Chu, the only candidate 
for metropolitan mayor in 2014 that won election (reelection in this case) 
and who replaced President Ma as chairman of the KMT after the elec-
tion. Chu was also the most popular among KMT possibles and arguably 
the most electable. However, Chu had vowed that he would serve out his 
term as mayor and, therefore, would not be a candidate for president. 
Several KMT leaders opined that there was still plenty of time to choose 
a candidate and that it could be done in May or June, and, furthermore, 
the party could “demand” that Chu accept the nomination.217
The KMT did have time; but as it turned out matters only got worse. 
Officially the choice of a presidential candidate was to be made by a par-
ty primary, the registration for which was to open on April 20 and close 
on May 16. In reality, however, public opinion polls and a vote by party 
members would decide: seventy percent weight being given to the former 
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and thirty percent to the latter. The favorite contenders were Eric Chu; 
Speaker of the Legislative Yuan, WANG Jin-pyng; Vice President WU 
Den-yih; and former Taipei Mayor HAU Lung-bin.218
When the twenty-seven day period to register ended, none of the 
KMT’s top guns had put forth his name. Wang and Wu both declared 
several times during this period that they would not run. KMT Chairman 
Chu stuck to his position. He said that the party could afford to lose the 
election but not a generation of voters or sacrifice its doctrines. Chu de-
clared it was his first concern to get the party back on its feet. He dis-
missed speculation that he would not run because he knew that he would 
not win. President Ma said Chu should run and that if he were Chu he 
would.219 In the meantime, two others, deputy legislative speaker HUNG 
Hsiu-chu and former health minister YANG Chih-liang, registered to 
run. But they were considered very much dark horses. The situation was 
obviously troubling for the KMT.220
The KMT’s prospects for finding a viable presidential candidate 
worsened as days and weeks passed. A popular magazine in Taiwan, 
Next, reported that many KMT members vowed not to support Wang be-
cause in 2014 in violation of the law he had helped a DPP leader who 
was in trouble and that his fairly high poll numbers came from DPP 
members who wanted to see him run, but would not vote for him.221 WU 
Den-yih was seen as having been too close to President Ma and as hav-
ing done little as vice president. HAU Lung-bin was seen as less hopeful 
than the other three. 
This served as the backdrop to the KMT’s national party congress 
on July 19 and, by default, it nominated legislator HUNG Hsiu-chu as its 
presidential candidate. In her acceptance speech Hung cited intra-party 
strife and the challenge of maintaining Taiwan’s economic competitive-
ness in the light of increasing globalization as problems that needed to be 
addressed. She promised, if elected, a fairer society that would transcend 
class, gender, ethnicity, and generations. She spoke of her being an “un-
likely candidate” because of her family background, even mentioning the 
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fact her father had served three years in a maximum-security prison for 
political prisoners under KMT rule.222
Hung was an unusual candidate: the KMT’s first female candidate 
for the presidency and the party’s first legislator chosen as a presidential 
candidate. Previous candidates had come from the executive branch of 
government or from local governments. She thus had no executive expe-
rience to speak of. She also had little international experience, less than 
any presidential contender since CHEN Shui-bian. This was a handicap 
given that the KMT had often made issue of Chen’s lack of such experi-
ence and associated it with his failed presidency. 
Even more troubling, Hung was at odds with her party owing to her 
headstrong support of a peace treaty with China, her view of the 1992 
Consensus (one China same interpretation versus different interpreta-
tions), and her in-your-face opposition to Taiwan independence. Observ-
ers explained that her less than mainstream views came from the fact 
Hung was elected to the legislature under the old Single Non-
Transferrable Vote in Multi-Member Districts system that allowed (even 
encouraged) less moderate candidates, and later was chosen from the 
party list; both meant she did not have to appeal to a broad segment of 
the population during a campaign. Finally, she had been a member of the 
more traditional New KMT Alliance faction whose members broke from 
the KMT and formed the New Party in 1993, though she stayed with the 
KMT.223
In any event, Hung alienated many KMT members. As a conse-
quence, party leaders forced Hung to accept their campaign platform; but 
by that time she had, to some degree, undermined the KMT’s criticism of 
TSAI Ing-wen’s status quo cross-Strait policy. This and her persistent 
low poll numbers engendered rumors that she would have to be replaced 
as the KMT’s presidential candidate.224
In August, James Soong, head of the pan-blue People First party, 
announced he would be a candidate for the presidency. Soong stated that 
he would help the country “rise above political confrontation” and would 
strive to forge a consensus among political parties (recognizing the pub-
lic’s dissatisfaction with party politics). He also said he would maintain 
peace in the Taiwan Strait. His proclamations had resonance. Yet it also 
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appeared he would split the conservative vote and help TSAI Ing-wen 
win the election.225
In any event, Soong quickly passed Hung in the polls, thus further 
bringing her candidacy into question.226 In fact, Soong’s supporters 
called for a “dump Hung, save Soong” movement hoping the KMT 
would support Soong. But this didn’t happen. Meanwhile observers 
opined Soong had entered the race not thinking seriously he would win, 
but rather calculating his campaign would help his party’s candidates 
running for legislative seats.227
In the ensuing three months Hung’s candidacy appeared less and 
less viable and as a consequence the KMT’s hopes of winning the presi-
dential election grew dimmer. Hung was unable to win favor with voters, 
as a host of opinion surveys indicated. Many KMT members lost faith in 
her and there grew fear that Hung might precipitate a party split.228 In 
October, KMT chairman Eric Chu apologized to Hung for the failing 
campaign ahead of an effort to remove her as the party’s candidate.229
Days later the KMT held an emergency meeting and voted overwhelm-
ingly to oust Hung and nominate Eric Chu the party’s presidential candi-
date. However, it was uncertain if this would improve the KMT’s chanc-
es to win the election.230
 The saga did not end there. Making matters worse for the KMT, 
Taiwan’s Special Investigative Division (of the Justice Department) be-
gan an investigation of a possible violation of Taiwan’s election laws. 
DPP legislator CHEN Ting-fei then publically accused Eric Chu of polit-
ical scheming that included offering money, a post-election position, and 
other enticements to get Hung to step down.231
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 Chairman Chu then apologized to the residents of New Taipei City 
for breaking his promise not to run for the presidency and took a three-
month leave from his job. Chu spoke of this being the KMT’s “darkest 
hour,” but he also said that polarization might be turned into unity. In 
addition, he stated he had entered politics seventeen years earlier to en-
sure a better future for later generations and this was his goal now.232
Chu then warned that if the DPP wins in January, “we will lose cross-
strait peace.”233
Based on Chu’s more moderate China policy, his ability to cam-
paign, and his considerable experience in government, some thought he 
had a good chance to win.234 But the opinion polls taken in the weeks af-
ter Chu became the KMT’s nominee did not bear this out. In one poll, 
47.1 percent of respondents said they planned to vote for Tsai and only 
16.4 percent favored Chu. Also most citizens still had a much better per-
ception of the DPP than the KMT.235
Soon the presidential candidates picked their vice presidential run-
ning mates. TSAI Ing-wen selected CHEN Chien-jen, vice president of 
Academic Sinica from 2011.  Eric Chu selected Jennifer Wang, a lawyer 
who had been head of the Council of Labor Affairs from 2008 to 2012. 
James Soong chose HSU Hsin-ying, who served as county councilor in 
Hsinchu and was elected to the legislature in 2012 (but withdrew from 
the KMT in January). Chu’s choice was more problematic than the oth-
ers, both owing to the fact he had contemplated picking another person 
and because Wang forthwith became the target of media criticism for her 
previous financial dealings.236
Oddly, none of the presidential candidates chose running mates 
from their own party. Moreover, all three chose vice presidential candi-
dates of the opposite sex. This appeared to reflect concern about the low 
status of political parties among voters and for Chu and Soong the im-
portance of appealing to female voters. 
 232.  Stacy Hsu, “Presidential Election: KMT’s Eric Chu takes over campaign,” Taipei
Times, October 18, 2015 (online at taipeitimes.com).   
 233.  “Taiwan’s embattled KMT ousts presidential candidate, Channel News Asia, October 
17, 2015 (online at channelnewsasia.com). 
 234.  “Taiwan’s KMT party ditches Hung Hsiu-chu as candidate,” BBC News, October 17, 
2015 (online at bbcnews.com). 
 235.  Stacy Hsu, “Chu fares worse than Hung in polls,” Taipei Times, October 30, 2015 
(online at taipeitimes.com). Taiwan Indicators Survey Research took the poll. 
 236.  Stacy Hsu, “Rumors rife over vice presidential picks,” Taipei Times, November 16, 
2015 (online at taipeitimes.com). 
 TAIWAN’S 2016 ELECTION 53 
The three presidential candidates, however, soon dominated the 
campaign. They differed in backgrounds and experience in a host of 
ways and offered disparate views on important issues.237
TSAI Ing-wen was born in southern Taiwan in 1956 to a well-to-do 
Hakka family. However, the family moved to Taipei when she was 
young. She graduated from the College of Law of National Taiwan Uni-
versity (Taiwan’s foremost institution of higher learning). She went to 
the United States for further study and received an LLM degree from 
Cornell University. She went from there to the U.K. where she studied 
for and received a PhD degree from the London School of Economics. 
She then returned to Taiwan. 
Tsai served on the Fair Trade Commission and the Copyright 
Commission under President LEE Teng-hui and was a consultant to the 
Mainland Affairs Council and the National Security Council. In 2000, 
President CHEN Shui-bian appointed her chairwoman of the Mainland 
Affairs Council. In this position she became well known in Taiwan. In 
2004, she joined the DPP and became a party-appointed member of the 
legislature and in 2006, she was selected vice premier. 
In 2008, Tsai was elected chairwoman of the DPP at a time when 
the party’s fortunes look bleak. She literally turned the party around. In 
2010, she was reelected chairwoman of the party with 90 percent of the 
vote. In November that year she ran for the position of New Taipei 
mayor, but lost. The defeat, however, did little if any damage to her ca-
reer since the district was comprised of a majority of KMT voters.238
The next year she won her party’s nomination to run for president in 
2012—the first female to attain that honor from a major Taiwan political 
party. She was also a unique DPP candidate. She was regarded as a 
scholar that espoused moderate to conservative views and did not take a 
strong stance on Taiwan’s independence. She was defeated in the elec-
tion in large measure because of the still strong residual effect of the 
Chen presidency, the DPP’s confused China policy, and her campaign’s 
inability to make inroads into central and north Taiwan. In addition, the 
United States supported the KMT and was hostile toward her and the 
DPP. MA Ying-jeou won 51.6 percent of the popular vote; Tsai won 
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45.6 percent. Tsai admitted responsibility for the loss and resigned as 
head of the party. However, she remained popular with her party and 
generally throughout Taiwan.239
In 2014, she was reelected chairwoman of the DPP. At the end of 
the year she led the DPP to a stunning victory in the Nine-in-One collec-
tion of local elections. This gave the party confidence and momentum 
leading up to the campaign for the 2016 election. Most members of her 
party as well as most citizens gave her credit for the win.240
Eric Chu was born in Taiwan in 1961 to a prominent political fami-
ly with KMT roots. He grew up in Taiwan and received his B.A. degree 
in management from National Taiwan University. After completing his 
compulsory military service he went to the U.S. for graduate education, 
receiving his M.A. degree in finance and PhD degree in accounting, both 
from New York University. He then taught at the City University of New 
York.
Chu subsequently returned to Taiwan to teach. But in 1998 he left 
his university to enter political life when he sought a seat in the legisla-
ture and won. In 2001, he ran for Taoyuan county magistrate taking the 
position formerly held by former Vice President Annette Lu. In 2005, he 
was reelected. From 2008 to 2009, he served concurrently as vice chair-
man of the KMT. In 2009, he was appointed vice premier, at age 48 the 
youngest person ever to serve in that office. In 2010, he was elected the 
first metropolitan mayor of the newly established New Taipei City (for-
merly Taipei County). 
Winning election to the executive head of Taiwan’s largest munici-
pality and in the process defeating TSAI Ing-wen (with 52.6 percent of 
the vote compared to Tsai’s 47.4 percent), Chu was deemed a rising star 
in the party.241 In 2014, Chu was reelected, though by a small margin, 
while other KMT candidates for mayors of municipal cities lost. This led 
to his election (unopposed) to the chairmanship of the KMT in early 
2015.
James Soong was born in Hunan Province in China in 1942. The 
family moved to Taiwan in 1949 when CHIANG Kai-shek’s forces were 
defeated in the Chinese civil war. Soong earned his B.A. degree in di-
plomacy from National Chengchi University and went to the United 
States for further study. He received an M.A. from the University of Cal-
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ifornia at Berkeley and a PhD from Georgetown, both degrees in political 
science. 
Soong returned to Taiwan and served as President CHIANG Ching-
kuo’s interpreter. In 1979, he was appointed Director General of the 
Government Information office where he served until 1984. He became a 
popular figure in Taiwan at this time. He then served as head of the 
KMT’s Department of Cultural Affairs from 1984 to 1987. In 1988, upon 
President CHIANG Ching-kuo’s death, Vice President LEE Teng-hui as-
sumed the presidency at which time Soong openly and aggressively (es-
pecially given Soong’s age) supported Lee against KMT members that 
did not trust him because he was Taiwanese. President Lee subsequently 
appointed Soong governor of Taiwan (province). 
When the position of governor of Taiwan became an elected one, 
Soong ran and won—with President Lee’s support. However, the two 
subsequently became estranged and in 1999, when Soong sought the 
KMT’s nomination to run for president, Lee supported his vice president, 
LIEN Chan, even though Soong was way ahead of Lien as well as the 
DPP’s CHEN Shui-bian in public opinion polls. Soong then ran as an in-
dependent. This split the conservative vote allowing Chen to win the 
election.242
In 2004, Soong ran as LIEN Chan’s vice presidential candidate, but 
the two were defeated in a successful reelection bid by President Chen 
(though Lien and Soong were ahead in the polls and it appeared they 
would win until Chen was shot by an assailant just before voting day). In 
2006, Soong ran for Taipei mayor and in 2012 ran for president against 
MA Ying-jeou. He was not successful in either race. 
In mid-December 2015, the Central Election Commission arranged 
three public debates for the presidential and vice presidential candidates. 
The first was for the vice-presidential candidates on Saturday December 
26. The second and third were presidential debates scheduled for De-
cember 27 and January 2. Nine media outlets sponsored the debates.243
During the two and one-half hour vice presidential candidates’ tele-
vised debate, the contestants focused on a range of issues: stagnant wag-
es, high housing prices, long- term care for the elderly, disease preven-
tion, education, and the low wages of women. The three were able to ask 
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questions of each other including about their presidential running mates 
and take questions from the audience.244
There were few sparks during the debate. In fact, the three candi-
dates agreed on a number of issues. All advocated reform and changes in 
government. All said that Taiwan’s citizens should decide its future. The 
debate certainly was not expected to change many voters’ minds.245
In contrast, the two presidential debates saw more lively presenta-
tions on issues and a clear delineation of views and platforms among the 
three candidates. The main issues discussed during the debate were the 
economy, relations with China and the United States, and the candidates’ 
leadership and vision. Specific issues included the 92 Consensus, “one 
China,” the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, Taiwan’s industries 
moving to China (referred to as “hollowing out”), the “red supply chain” 
(production networking with China), food safety, and education.246
TSAI Ing-wen restated her position that she sought to maintain the 
status quo in cross-Strait relations, although she said the 92 Consensus 
was “an option and not Taiwan’s only option.” She asserted that Taiwan 
should develop a “national team” to support industries that had to com-
pete with those countries that had government support (meaning mainly 
China), and diplomacy based on a stronger economy and democracy. 
Boasting of her leadership abilities she cited the cohesiveness of the DPP 
in contrast to the fractured KMT.247
Eric Chu spoke of the importance of economic ties with China and 
amicable cross-Strait relations so that Taiwan could expand its economic 
ties elsewhere. He stated that Taiwan should stick to the 92 Consensus. 
He advocated that Taiwan pursue free trade and the economy remain 
open. He talked of Taiwan needing confidence in pursuing its diplomacy. 
He said he had helped make the KMT a “democratic party” where vari-
ous ideas could be expressed, in contrast to a DPP that was dominated by 
the “Ing faction” (meaning TSAI Ing-wen).248
James Soong presented himself as not being bound by either of the 
two major parties and thus as having a clear and meaningful vision for 
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Taiwan. On several major issues he took a middle ground position. For 
example, on the matter of one China he supported keeping the title of 
Republic of China while pushing for the autonomy of the people of Tai-
wan. Diplomatic success, he said, depended on good relations with China 
and mutual trust. He boasted that among the three candidates he had the 
most experience in politics and had the ability deal with both parties 
(since if elected he would have to form a coalition government).249
For Eric Chu the debates afforded an opportunity to present his 
views and correct misperceptions of him and the KMT. Chu needed to 
change the commonly held view that he and the KMT had been pushing 
“production over distribution” and “capitalists over workers.” Because 
Chu and his party were perceived to favor the rich over the middle class 
and the poor, he promised to increase taxes on the wealthy in order to 
lower taxes on others. He also pledged he would deal with the generation 
gap.250
Chu hoped to capitalize on the fact that he was a very skilled debat-
er and could best TSAI Ing-wen. In fact, prior to the debates Chairwom-
an Tsai stated that debates and public performances were not her strong 
suits, though she said she had been preparing for weeks.251 After the de-
bate, observers opined that Chu had won the debate from the presentation 
point of view. But Tsai’s careful planning and Soong’s well-honed de-
bate skills prevented Chu from “capturing the moment.”252
Since Tsai did not perform badly, meaning she made no real blun-
ders, it was difficult to imagine that Chu could dramatically change pub-
lic opinion that had favored Tsai and the DPP by a big margin for some 
time. Hence, one would conclude that the debates had limited impact. 
Tsai’s weak point, in Chu’s estimation, was her vague stance on the 92 
Consensus. Tsai, when question about this, repeated her position that she 
would “respect public opinion and democratic mechanisms to promote 
cross-strait relations within the current Republic of China system.” While 
her position was still unclear, it ostensibly satisfied a majority of voters. 
Meanwhile, Tsai’s attack on Chu for his unclear “one Taiwan” concept 
and her criticism of him for the fact the KMT had not engaged in “some 
hard introspection” had resonance.253
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Clearly the debate produced no winners and losers. After it was 
over, the campaign resumed its prior track. 
Little happened that was of consequence during the last two weeks 
of the campaign. There was no surprising event as there had been in 
2004, CHEN Shui-bian and Annette Lu being shot, to change the results 
of the voting. Campaigning proceeded as it had been. Hence, it was pret-
ty certain to most observers what the outcome of the election would be. 
VIII.   THE ELECTION RESULTS 
Voting began early in the morning of January 16. For voters the 
casting of balloting took some time since 18 political parties were com-
peting for 34 at-large seats in the Legislative Yuan, the largest number 
ever. Also there were three ballots (one to vote for president, one to 
choose a constituency legislator, and one to support a political party—the 
latter some 73 centimeters long in some districts).254 Nevertheless, by the 
time the polls closed enough ballots had been tallied that the results were 
readily apparent. 
At 7 p.m., Chu apologized to his supporters for failing to live up to 
their expectations. He stated that he must shoulder the blame and prom-
ised to resign as chairman of the KMT. He further said he respects the 
electorate’s decision and hoped Tsai and the DPP would “steer the nation 
toward a brighter and happier future.”255
James Soong also conceded defeat. He stated he hoped Tsai would 
keep her campaign promises. He asserted that peace is what people on 
both sides of the Taiwan Strait and around the world want and “the ball 
is now in the DPP’s court.”256
President Ma declared that the election was testament to the demo-
cratic achievements of Taiwan and the Republic of China’s constitutional 
framework. He went on to say: “I expect the new president to continue 
upholding the current state of peace and prosperity across the Taiwan 
Strait.”257
Premier Mao then announced he would step down. He stated: “A 
new public consensus has been formed with the ending of the last week-
end’s elections.” He went on: “In respect of this, and to also ensure the 
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smooth execution of future government matters, I have tendered my res-
ignation to the president and have announced a Cabinet reshuffle.”258
At an international news conference at 8:30 that evening, TSAI Ing-
wen formally announced her victory. She thanked her rivals and prom-
ised cross-party collaboration. She said Chu and Soong had upheld dem-
ocratic values during both the campaign. Tsai promised to work with the 
current government to “complete the power transition with the purpose 
of maintaining political stability.” She didn’t chide or taunt the other 
side.259
In fact, president-elect Tsai quickly turned to her and the DPP’s re-
sponsibilities. She spoke of working on reforms and maintaining stabil-
ity. She said she would honor her promises about cross-strait relations 
and vowed “communicating with no provocations or accidents.” She 
called on members of the DPP and those who would be joining her ad-
ministration to “be humble, humble, and humble.”260
Others, however, chose to talk more about the utter defeat of the 
KMT, the significance of the Tsai/DPP victory, and how Taiwan would 
henceforth be different—better. Many wanted to enjoy the glory of the 
election win. Some saw it as an opportunity for revenge. Most viewed it 
as historic. 
Tsai’s supporters met at the DPP’s headquarters to express their 
glee about the election results and to congratulate Tsai and her running 
mate CHEN Chien-jen. Some carried placards. One read: “Taiwan would 
not be good if the KMT had not gone down.” Another: “Tsai is Asia’s
Angela Merkel.” Many chanted zongtong hao (greetings president). In a 
milieu of yelling, cheering, waving flags, blowing horns, and exploding 
fireworks, Tsai told the crowd: “I’ve said that I would sacrifice my life to 
make you happy and now I have kept my promise.” She further stated: 
“Let’s welcome a new age of Taiwan with joy.”261
An editorial writer for the pro-DPP Taipei Times summarized the 
significance of the election and explained why the DPP victory hap-
pened. First, he said the successful transfer of power had become routine, 
which meant Taiwan’s democracy rested on a strong foundation. Second, 
Taiwan reached a milestone in electing a female president thus breaking 
the “female glass ceiling.” Third, the KMT was relegated to the status of 
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an opposition party due to its inferior policies, its disconnect from the 
public, internal power struggles, its nomination of flawed candidates, and 
it pursuing party reforms that did not work. Fourth, some smaller parties 
did well. The Corporal HUNG Chung-chiu case and the Sunflower 
Movement that mobilized the nation’s youth which helped speed up so-
cial reform explain this. Fifth, President Ma overreached in pursuing ties 
with China to Taiwan’s disadvantage. Ma’s strategy, he wrote, was to 
move toward the international community through China; in contrast the 
DPP’s strategy was, and is, to move toward China through the interna-
tional community.262
Writers at the South China Morning Post in Hong Kong suggested 
four reasons for the KMT loss: poor handling of the economy, failing to 
win over young voters, party infighting, and policy flips on key domestic 
issues.263 Other pundits and observers agreed but cited still other reasons: 
the KMT was an aging party, the “spirit of democracy” eluded Ma and 
his party, KMT officials were arrogant, HUNG Hsiu-chu was not a good 
candidate, Eric Chu entered the race too late, and top KMT leaders did 
not sincerely examine the party’s deficiencies and correct them.264 One 
writer also mentioned the KMT’s relationship with local factions and the 
network of local party branches had not functioned well.265
How big were Tsai and the DPP’s wins? The final results were as 
follows: Tsai and her vice presidential running mate won 6.89 million 
votes, or 56.12 percent of the popular vote. Eric Chu and his running ma-
te took 3.81 million votes or 31.04 percent of the votes cast. James 
Soong won 1.58 million or 12.84 percent. The DPP’s candidates defeated 
Eric Chu and his running mate by 3.08 million votes. They won more 
votes than the two conservative or pan-blue party candidates com-
bined.266 Tsai and her running mate won in districts that were KMT 
strongholds.267 They won in all counties and municipalities except   
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Hualien, Taitung, Lienchiang, and Kinmen—18 in total compared to 
Chu’s four. Tsai even won in New Taipei City where Chu was mayor.268
In short their election victory was huge. 
The results of the legislative election were almost the same. The 
DPP won 68 of the 113 seats in that body for a comfortable majority. (57 
seats constitute a majority.) The KMT won but 35 seats (compared to 64 
it held before the election). More specifically the DPP won 49 electoral 
district seats, 18 at-large seats, and one lowland Aborigine seat (com-
pared to 27, 13 and zero they won in the 2012 election). Of the at-large 
seats (which represents the party vote) the DPP took 18 and the KMT 11. 
The People First Party and the New Power Party won two and three re-
spectively. The percentage vote of the four was 44.06, 26.91, 6.52 and 
6.11. The DPP’s win was decisive, giving it a majority in the lawmaking 
body of government for the first time ever.269
Among the third parties, only the People First Party (PFP) and the 
New Power Party (NPP) won enough party votes (five percent) to obtain 
at-large seats. The PFP won a larger portion of party votes; but the NPP 
won district seats giving it a larger representation in the Legislative Yu-
an. Five parties won enough votes (at least 3.5 percent) to qualify for 
government subsidies amounting to NT$50 (US$1.49) for each vote re-
ceived for the next four years. Neither the New Party nor the Taiwan Sol-
idarity Union won any seats.270 The TSU (with only 2.5 percent of the 
vote) discussed disbanding after the election.271
The third parties did not perform well enough to challenge the 
DPP’s new hold on political power. This indicates that Tsai’s concern 
about the new political parties precluding the DPP from winning a ma-
jority in the legislature was unfounded. Yet, there are some other facts to 
consider. There were many vote splitters. A full 29 percent of voters cast 
ballots in the party preference part of the election for one of the 16 minor 
parties—3.5 million out 12.2 million party ballots cast. Nearly 2 million 
citizens voted for parties left out of the cohort of winners of legislative 
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seats. This does not suggest the smaller parties are dead or that there is 
no longer anti-political party sentiment among voters.272
Some observers also mentioned the status of independent politi-
cians, such as Taipei Mayor Ko. In fact, there had been talk of a “Ko ef-
fect.” There were also a number of “maverick” candidates that won elec-
tion. This gave rise to speculation on whether candidates’ political views 
may outweigh their party affiliation in future elections.273 This suggests 
the two-party system may not be as solid as it seemed. Finally, there 
were palpable sentiments of aloofness among voters who were arguably 
suffering from “voter fatigue” and/or doubt that the two major parties’ 
core issues, independence and unification, were the “call” of common 
people.274
What happened to the so-called “legislative races to watch”? A 
number of candidates who were not expected to win did win. The expla-
nation is easy: some were simply attractive (or charismatic) to voters or 
they campaigned very well. But some were also anti-establishment or 
“third force” candidates. Some won with a small percentage of the votes 
due to multiple candidates running in some districts. In some cases party 
loyalty and/or discipline were missing.275
In any event, the makeup of the new legislature is different in some 
notable ways. It has 43 females, 5 more than the previous legislature. 
(Taiwan now ranks tenth in the world in the proportion of women in the 
national legislature.) The new legislature is younger: those aged 30 to 39 
rose from 8 to 11. There is one member that is less than 30 years old (be-
fore there was none). Those over age 60 dropped in number from 25 to 
18. There are 54 that challenged incumbents and won. Voters elected 
seven percent Aborigines (who are but 1.5 percent of the population) to 
the lawmaking body of government. However, the level of education de-
clined: There were 27 in the old legislature that held PhD degrees; now 
there are 20.276
The level of seniority was dramatically reduced by this election. 
The 19 KMT incumbents who lost had 68 terms of seniority collectively; 
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non-KMT challengers that had only a total of 6 terms of service took 
their seats. The 24 KMT candidates who won district or indigenous seats 
have but a total of 48 terms of seniority. Thus, some referred to one re-
sult of the election being a “new generation of politics.”277
One piece of less than good news: voter turnout in this election was 
a record low since the enacting of a direct presidential and vice presiden-
tial election system. The rate was 66.27 for the presidential part of the 
election. For voting for the district seats of the legislative election it was 
66.58 percent; for the party or at-large vote it was 66.25 percent.278 This 
appeared to reflect a growing disenchantment with politics in Taiwan, 
even its democracy, and/or with party politics. Alternatively it mirrored 
Taiwan’s maturing democracy.
There were, however, other explanations. In part causing the low 
voter turnout (and also affecting the election results though not the fact 
Tsai and the DPP won) was the fact that a number of likely or potential 
KMT voters chose to stay at home and not vote yet they did not want to 
vote for DPP or other candidates. In fact, the number by some estimates 
may have been as high as one million.279
Another factor was that not many of the one or two million people 
from Taiwan living in China (some say as many as four million, certainly 
a number that has been growing fast), who have been, and presumably 
still are, mainly KMT supporters, did not return to vote.280 Using the 
lower figure (one million) and assuming most are adults, this could mean 
10 percent of the electorate. The media in Taiwan reported that the num-
ber of returned voters was not large compared to previous elections. Al-
so, the number of flights and the seats on the airplanes going back and 
forth had not increased thus confirming the view that a large number of 
voters residing in China were missing. One might assume that since the 
large majority of these potential voters favored the KMT and they were 
disillusioned or thought the KMT had little chance of winning, so they 
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did not choose to return. Finally, Chinese authorities did not do much to 
persuade them to go back to vote. 
How does this square with the fact that opinion polls during the few 
months before the election predicted the results consistently and accu-
rately?281 Those who chose not to vote may have had this intent much 
earlier and expressed this to pollsters. The no-shows from China were 
not factored in since those taking polls did so only in Taiwan. Thus, the 
polls were accurate considering their stated parameters. 
During the campaign, the gambler’s odds did not offer predictions 
that differed much from the pollsters. Anyway the odds were not widely 
known to the public since the government cracked down on the gam-
blers’ activities and made arrests during the campaign and this dominated 
media reporting rather than their predictions.282
The government also cracked down on vote buying. Vote buying 
has long been a factor in Taiwan’s elections though it has been less a 
problem in recent years.283 Ballots, by regulation, are kept from the view 
of others and many voters do not do as they are instructed or as they are 
paid to vote; thus the effectiveness of vote buying has been in question. 
Finally, special efforts were made ahead of this election to prevent vote 
buying.284
Some “special” candidates running for Legislative Yuan seats de-
serve mention. HUANG Kuo-chang, HUNG Tsu-yung and Freddy Lim 
representing the NPP all won in traditional KMT strongholds.285 Huang 
was a former professor of law at Academia Sinica and one of the leaders 
of the Sunflower Movement. Hung is the sister of HUNG Chung-chiu, 
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the soldier who died during training in 2013 causing mass protest and a 
demand for military reform. Lim is a singer, an ardent advocate of Tai-
wan’s independence, and the founder of the New Power Party. Former 
premier SU Tseng-chang’s daughter, SU Chiao-hui, won a legislative 
seat in New Taipei’s fifth district with 56 percent of the vote representing 
the DPP.286 HSIAO Bi-khim (who is Eurasian of an American mother 
and who had been President CHEN Shui-bian’s interpreter, won a legis-
lative seat in Hualien with 53.8 percent of the votes in a four-person race 
even though TSAI Ing-wen got only 37 percent of the vote there. One of 
the candidates she defeated, she had lost to in the previous election.287
HAU Long-bin, former Taipei mayor and earlier considered a possible 
KMT candidate for president, lost his bid to represent Keelung. 
CHIANG Kai-shek’s great grandson, CHIANG Wan-an, won a seat in 
the legislature representing the KMT.288 LIN Li-chan, who was born in 
Cambodia and married a man from Taiwan 18 years earlier, won a seat 
for the KMT.289
Shortly after the results of the election were announced the United 
States officially congratulated Tsai and the DPP. However, the State De-
partment message also included congratulations to the people of Taiwan 
for “once again demonstrating the strength of their robust democratic 
system” and mentioned a “profound interest in the continuation of cross-
Strait peace and stability.” The message even thanked President MA 
Ying-jeou for developing a strong partnership with the United States and 
applauded him for improving cross-Strait ties.290
Subsequently a number of members of the U.S. Congress sent mes-
sages of congratulations and/or support. Edward Royce, chairman of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee, promised to strengthen security rela-
tions and garner support for Taiwan to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
agreement. Former chairwoman, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, dispatched a letter 
to TSAI Ing-wen describing Taiwan as a “beacon of freedom.” Others, 
including members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, made 
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similar statements.291 While campaigning in the coming presidential elec-
tion, U.S. Republicans Marco Rubio and Ted Cruz issued statements of 
support for Taiwan. Hillary Clinton did not.292
The Obama administration was uncharacteristically quiet about the 
election, odd given what appeared to be a profound change of policy and 
support for Tsai and the DPP during the campaign and even talk, in the 
context of strained U.S.-China relations over China’s activities in the 
South China Sea, China’s currency devaluations, and cyber-attacks on 
the U.S., the effect Obama was playing the “Taiwan card” against Chi-
na.293
But other evidence suggested something different. Washington sent 
a representative to Taiwan following the election, former Deputy Secre-
tary of State, Bill Burns, currently president of the Carnegie Endowment 
for Peace. Burns met with both president-elect Tsai and President Ma. 
Also, at this time it was reported current Deputy Secretary of State Anto-
ny Blinken would visit Beijing.294 Some pundits opined the White House 
had adopted a stance of negligible, if any, involvement of Taiwan in 
Washington’s “rebalance” policy in Asia because of concerns over Chi-
na’s reaction.295 Finally it was disclosed that it was unlikely the U.S. 
would sell advanced fighter planes to Taiwan in the next decade.296
Nevertheless, president-elect Tsai promised U.S. officials that she 
would continue to cultivate close relations with the United States and 
would strive to maintain peace and stability in the region. In the immedi-
ate wake of the election Tsai dispatched DPP Secretary-General Joseph 
Wu, who had been Taiwan’s representative to Washington from 2007 to 
2008, to the U.S. to reassure American officials of her intent to pursue a 
pro-U.S. policy and maintain stable relations with China.297
Japan sent an official note of congratulations to Tsai on her victory. 
The Foreign Ministry also issued an official statement saying the Abe 
government looked forward to “deepening cooperation.” Chief Cabinet 
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Secretary, Yoshihide Suga, reiterated Japan’s support for Taiwan to join 
the TPP. The explanation for Japan’s unusually cordial response was 
this: The DPP has fonder feelings toward Japan than the KMT while its 
culture reflects more Japanese influence. TSAI Ing-wen visited Japan in 
October and cemented close ties with leaders of the ruling Japanese Lib-
eral Democratic Party and top government leaders.298 Last but not least, 
some said it was a reaction to Japan’s strained relations with China.
A host of other countries sent messages of compliments to Tsai and 
the DPP. Most commented in a positive way about Taiwan’s democracy 
and its first woman president. But many also expressed concern about the 
new government maintaining peace with China and advised caution and 
constraint.299
China’s immediate reaction to the Tsai/DPP victory was not as un-
welcoming as many had expected. However, initial comment was sparse. 
Yet, there was some casting of blame. GONG Qinggai, the deputy head 
of Taiwan Affairs Office was reportedly under investigation for “serious 
violations of discipline.”300 President Xi may have been dissatisfied with 
the office because of the Tsai and the DPP’s win, or may have used the 
election as a reason to inspect this office.301 On the other hand, there was 
blogging on the Internet and elsewhere to the effect that the party Beijing 
wanted to win did not, that the KMT had not performed well so lost the 
election, and even that a change of parties was a good thing.302
The Chinese government through Xinhua News Agency subse-
quently warned Tsai and the DPP that its determination to protect Chi-
na’s sovereignty was “hard as a rock” and it would resolutely oppose any 
secessionist activities. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs then issued a 
statement on the election saying the Taiwan issue is an internal matter. It 
went on to state that there is only one China and China’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity will not be broken up.  But this position had been stat-
ed many times before and was cited before the election. 
A few days later, an army unit stationed in the city of Xiamen 
across the Taiwan Strait from Taiwan conduced live fire exercises and 
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landing drills. However, the Ministry of National Defense declined spe-
cific comment on the matter and said a CCTV report gave an “exaggerat-
ed and false report” by using footage of an exercise conducted a year ear-
lier. Apparently the military wanted to do something to show force and 
top officials in Beijing allowed that.303 Taiwan subsequently conducted 
small military drills on the Offshore Islands, very near China, but Beijing 
did not respond.304
Later, a Chinese admiral, LOU Yuan, was quoted in the media say-
ing, “war is inevitable if Taiwan keeps pushing for independence” 
though he tempered that comment adding that “we will respect public 
opinion” (meaning opinion in both China and Taiwan). But Lou’s posi-
tion in the navy was not one that made his statement seriously threaten-
ing.305 On another front, it was reported that China was cutting the num-
ber of tourists going to Taiwan by one-third to one-half ahead of TSAI 
Ing-wen assuming the presidency and that this would affect Taiwan’s 
economy.306
The following week China’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) stated 
that its policy toward Taiwan would remain unchanged following the na-
tional elections in Taiwan. LONG Mingpu, deputy director of TAO add-
ed: “Following elections for the leader of the ‘Taiwan Region’. . . rela-
tions will become more complicated. But. . . our larger Taiwan policy 
will remain unchanged.”307
In sum, China did not act rashly or seriously threaten Taiwan after 
the election. Its stance was one of wait and see. 
IX.   CONCLUSIONS AND FORECASTS 
To reach meaningful conclusions about Taiwan’s 2016 election—
the campaign, the results of the balloting, and its implications—it is nec-
essary to reexamine the election theories cited earlier, consider other as-
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sessments, judge the short-term and long-term effects of the election, and 
forecast the success (or failure) of Taiwan’s new leadership.
First, there is the pocketbook theory. There is little doubt that the 
economy weighed heavily on voters. Before and during the campaign 
there were serious concerns, even worries, on the minds of citizens about 
the economy and considerable loss of confidence in the KMT about 
managing it. Tsai and the DPP won (or the KMT lost) the argument 
about who could best fix Taiwan’s economic problems. In other words, 
the economic theory of who wins elections goes far in explaining the re-
sults of this election. 
But this demands further elaboration. The truth is that the Ma ad-
ministration’s economic performance in its eight years at the helm was 
nearly the same as that of the previous (CHEN Shui-bian) administration. 
In terms of the average growth in the GDP it was very close. The set-
backs were also similar. Both administrations were affected very ad-
versely by global recessions. In fact, what Ma faced was worse than that 
which had impacted the Chen administration. Moreover, Chen’s prob-
lems were in large measure of his own making since he hurt economic 
growth by his stance (and actions) on nuclear energy, his pro-welfare 
budget, and other positions that troubled the business community, not to 
mention political gridlock he caused.308
However, in Ma and the KMT’s case the public’s perceptions were 
quite different. For some time leading up to this election the media re-
ported extensively on the bad side-effects of the poorly performing econ-
omy. Never mind that these problems also plagued other places through-
out the world and that cutting or reducing ties with China would have 
had serious negative economic consequences for Taiwan. 
There were two other critical factors. One, as noted before, Tai-
wan’s economy in late 2015 and into January 2016, leading up to the 
election, performed very poorly. This affected voters. Two, populism had 
become a major variable in Taiwan’s politics and populist politicians as 
well as academics and the media were quick to cast blame on the KMT 
for Taiwan’s travails.
In this milieu Tsai and the DPP offered solutions that voters thought 
would work. Clearly their ideas looked better in terms of helping remedy 
Taiwan’s immediate problems. Especially appealing to voters were 
promises to change the inequality drift and generate opportunities for 
small businesses, the youth, and workers. 
 308.  See John F. Copper, “Taiwan in Gridlock: Thoughts on the Chen Shui-bian Admin-
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Thus the economic theory of elections, especially if perceptions are 
weighted more heavily than facts, and if it is noted that one side (the 
DPP) presented a better case to the public than the other (the KMT), ap-
peared to be valid in explaining the results of the election. 
The watermelon and the pendulum theories were less explanatory. 
Both appeared to have validity, but each contradicted or refuted the oth-
er. The watermelon theory appeared correct in the sense that the 2016 
election was, particularly in terms of the voters’ perceptions and prefer-
ences and the way they voted, a continuation of the 2014 election. Final-
ly, the results of the 2016 election were correctly predicted based on the 
results of the 2014 election. 
Yet looking at what some considered a better frame of reference or 
comparison point, the presidential/legislative election in 2012, the pendu-
lum theory seems to better explain the winners and losers. Ma and the 
KMT’s slide began mainly after this election. There was no second term 
curse before this. As shown clearly in the results of the 2016 election 
voters were dissatisfied and strongly desired change; this was not the 
case in 2012. 
Concerning the significance of this election, it is easy to make a 
case that it stands out among Taiwan’s many recent elections in a num-
ber of respects. This is true not only of the election results, but probably 
what lasting impact it will have. 
What the media most often mentioned in assessing the election was 
the obvious. It was precedent breaking for Taiwan to elect a female pres-
ident. But there was more to it than that. Little noticed was the fact TSAI 
Ing-wen, unlike other female heads of state in Asia, did not come from a 
political family nor could she be considered a member of a dynasty. Her 
family was rich, but not political. Also, male chauvinism defined her par-
ty more than most political parties, certainly more than the KMT. She 
had to overcome that. Tsai also represented her party’s claim (and Tai-
wan’s) to be progressive and to be ahead of other places in the world in 
terms avant-garde historical change. This gave her being the first female 
president even more salience.309
Second, the opposition won control of the legislature. The DPP had 
never held a majority in the legislature before. This was a handicap when 
the DPP was the ruling party from 2000 to 2008. There were a number of 
explanations cited for this. Tsai had coattails. She was popular and won 
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big. The DPP offered talented candidates, many whom had excelled in 
local politics on the way up. The DPP’s election strategy was sound.
In any case, the DPP’s majority position in the legislature will mean 
it can determine the lawmaking agenda. It will help Tsai be a stronger 
and more effective president. The two branches of government should 
now be in sync. (This was not the case during the Ma presidency due to 
disunity in the KMT and the Ma-Wang feud.) There are, of course, some 
caveats; but they at least now seem minor. One, the DPP will likely need 
KMT cooperation to pass Constitutional amendments. Two, it is uncer-
tain to what degree the new minor parties will stick with the DPP.310
The third takeaway from this election is that Taiwan’s democracy is 
alive and well. The democratic processes worked well and for that Tai-
wan gained respect and admiration both at home and elsewhere. This is 
especially meaningful given the fact that democratic systems are not 
working well around the world. Hence, Taiwan may be seen as a mod-
el.311
Fourth, this election will by all accounts mean that needed reform in 
Taiwan will be accomplished, including important matters got missed in 
Taiwan’s past efforts at reform.312 In recent years, political polarization 
impeded reform. Now the situation is different. One might expect that 
reforms are coming in spades. Likely the gap between the election and 
the new president assuming office will be closed. The voting age will 
probably be lowered. The relationship between the executive and legisla-
tive branches of government can be clarified. Taiwan’s presidential sys-
tem will remain; but some facets of it may be repaired. The issue of ab-
sentee voting may be resolved. The path to citizenship and the rights of 
new citizens to vote hopefully will be fixed. The issue of nuclear energy 
could be resolved once and for all. The education system in Taiwan 
needs to be improved, and chances are it will be in some ways at least. 
Reform of the judiciary seems a good prospect. Businesses in Taiwan 
complain of overregulation; this needs to be fixed. It can be. The cost of 
the national health care system is a burden and good doctors are leaving; 
this and the welfare system in general need attention and will probably 
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get it—though the DPP will not want to cut social programs. There are a 
host of other issues to deal with. 
Last but not least, it is necessary to assess the election from the per-
spective of the challenges President Tsai and the DPP as the ruling party 
now face. The two most often concerns or worries cited by the pundits 
and the media in the election’s aftermath were Taiwan’s economy and 
relations with China. 
Tsai and the DPP assumed power at a time when Taiwan’s economy 
was not performing well and the prospects for an upturn, at least in the 
short run, were not good.313 Voters’ confidence in Tsai and the DPP to 
improve the economy was a large reason for their casting votes for them. 
After the election many voters reported they were banking on them to 
spur economic growth.314 However, the population’s expectations may 
far exceed the ability of Tsai and the DPP to deliver. 
Tsai’s ideas about fixing the economy that she put forth during the 
campaign were simplistic. Many are not easy to implement. Some will 
probably have little effect. Hence for Tsai and the DPP the post-election 
economic situation was not unlike what MA Ying-jeou faced shortly af-
ter he became president. The trends for the coming year or even further 
out do not appear to warrant optimism for Taiwan’s economy to grow.315
This is likely to weigh heavily on Taiwan’s new political leadership.
Not only is the global economic milieu unfavorable, TSAI Ing-wen 
and the DPP face serious micro-economic problems. Taiwan’s economy 
needs restructuring. Something has to be done about real wage stagna-
tion. However, increasing wages for lower paid employees following 
proposals Tsai and the DPP made during the campaign run contrary to 
resolving Taiwan’s brain drain. Talent is leaving Taiwan due to pay in 
Taiwan’s tech sector not competing with other countries in Asia. Another 
problem is that Taiwan’s industrial sector is not sufficiently diversified; 
it leans heavily on the electronics industry, which is being threatened by 
China developing its electronic industries that will both compete with 
Taiwan and may exclude Taiwan companies from its production 
chains.316 Tsai touted the U.S. backed Trans-Pacific Partnership agree-
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ment as one solution. But it will hurt some of Taiwan’s industries.317 Fur-
thermore, it is hardly a panacea to resolve Taiwan’s economic problems 
and is likely to create new political and other problems for the Tsai ad-
ministration.318
During the campaign Tsai Ing-wen advocated Taiwan cement free 
trade agreements, or FTAs. But President Ma successfully negotiated 
FTAs with two countries, Singapore and New Zealand, in large measure 
because China did not try to block the agreements. Can Taiwan now 
reach more such deals without China’s concurrence? This seems doubt-
ful. Meanwhile, China and the U.S. signing FTAs hurts Taiwan’s econ-
omy, notably one with South Korea (one of Taiwan’s main trade compet-
itor).319 Tsai also hinted of using fiscal stimulus to prod economic 
growth. As cited earlier, Taiwan has a significant debt burden; this will 
be an impediment to using this tactic to increase economic growth. Any-
way the KMT used it and it did not prove very effective. 
A special problem is that Taiwan’s economic growth for some years 
has been underpinned by cutting edge industries, notably computers and 
electronics. Recently slumping demand has hurt local companies such as 
Acer and Asustek that flourished during the PC boom. Smartphone mak-
er HTC once lauded as Taiwan’s successful post-PC high tech company 
has seen its global market share fall because of competition from Apple, 
South Korea’s Samsung, and China’s Xiaomi and Huawei. Many of 
Taiwan’s company heads perceive Taiwan faces two serious problems: 
China is breaking into the area of sophisticated electronics and the “red 
supply chain” cuts Taiwan out of global interconnectedness.320
Taiwan’s business community, including its high tech sector, is not 
happy about Tsai and the DPP condemning it for profiteering on com-
merce with China to the disadvantage of small businesses and workers 
and thus causing the rich-poor gap to increase. Business’s falling confi-
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dence in the future of the economy and in Tsai’s ability to fix it have 
made relations between the two worse. 
A related problem is Taiwan’s spending on social welfare. The DPP 
is an advocate for the poor and disadvantaged and has long pushed for 
more government help to these groups. In this connection it needs to be 
noted that the KMT has been the main implementer of government assis-
tance programs (the national health care system and many others) in or-
der to preempt the DPP’s “people agenda.”321 In fact the KMT has over-
reached. Tsai and the DPP will thus find it difficult to expand social 
welfare.
President Tsai and the DPP can, of course, argue that they inherited 
a bad economy and in 2016 there was a global slowdown. This is true. 
But President Ma and the KMT made this case. The real question is: 
How long will this argument work for the new leadership? 
Judging from the international media’s reporting the second over-
riding problem for Tsai and the DPP is Taiwan’s relationship with China. 
In fact, this is seen as their most daunting task. Furthermore, this chal-
lenge for the new regime is very much related to the first, the econo-
my.322
The problem is this: the DPP’s support Taiwan’s independence and 
its possessing sovereignty conflicts with China’s position that there is on-
ly one China and Taiwan is a part of China. Tsai cannot, without risking 
a loss of party support, repudiate the party’s stance. Yet she needs good 
relations with China. She will need to continue to be vague about Tai-
wan’s status. But that will not be easy.
Beijing’s reaction to Tsai not accepting the 92 Consensus and one-
China, initially at least, will probably begin with economic pressure. In 
fact, some say this started well before the election—perhaps. As noted, 
three months before the election, it was reported Chinese authorities 
would cut the number of tourists going to Taiwan in the month prior to 
the election by 95 percent. 
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The travel industry in Taiwan expressed serious concern, even 
alarm, over this.323 Taiwan’s hotel sector was already suffering from over 
capacity. It was reported that 899 new hotels had opened for business 
from July 2008 and 150 more were to be ready in 2016. Occupancy rates 
during 2015 fell. Other tourist-related businesses from airlines and tour 
companies to small stores and restaurants feared a fall in Chinese visi-
tors.324
China can put enormous pressure on Taiwan in other ways. It might 
cut investments in Taiwan. The DPP has recently expressed opposition to 
China obtaining part interest in some of Taiwan’s high tech companies 
even though this would facilitate exports. Beijing could pare Taiwan out 
of the production chains that China controls. China’s companies are al-
ready filling the gap. 
Any of these actions, certainly two or three together, could be 
enough to cause a serious economic downturn. A recession may follow. 
China might also “forget” to invite Taiwan to partake in its huge 
global investment projects. Some of them are cover regions Taiwan is 
not part of. The Silk Road naturally does not include Taiwan (Taiwan be-
ing a geographic outlier), though arguably Beijing could expand it to do 
so. During the first ten months of 2015 Chinese companies signed con-
tracts worth $64.5 billion with countries involved.325
The reality is China is a large, formidable, player in the world econ-
omy—especially in foreign trade and investments. As the record shows it 
is the foremost dynamo behind economic growth in the world. China’s 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, its New Development Bank, and 
its Silk Road projects will each inject tens of billions of dollars into the 
global economy. It is estimated that China’s global financial investments 
by 2025 will total $1.25 trillion (giving that a frame of reference the U.S. 
Marshall Plan after World War II was $103 billion in today’s dollars).326
Taiwan not being involved will mean that it foregoes an important 
stimulant to its economy. Yet Tsai and the DPP take the position that 
Taiwan is too tied to China economically and this will handicap Tai-
wan’s future economic growth. Hence China can hardly be blamed for an 
economic downturn in Taiwan. 
 323.  “Cuts in Chinese tourist numbers before Taiwan election confirmed,” Focus Taiwan, 
October 6, 2015 (online at focustaiwan.tw). 
 324.  Matthew Fulco, “Tourist businesses fear fall in Chinese visitors,” Nikkei Asian Re-
view, December 22, 2015 (online at asianikkei, com). 
 325.  He Bin and Li Jia, “Along the Belt and Road,” News China, March 2016, p. 29. 
 326.  David Shambaugh, “China’s Soft Power Push,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2015, p. 
100.
76 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES
China might also apply diplomatic pressure on Taiwan. As noted, 
Taipei expanded its international space during the Ma years largely as a 
product of it promoting better cross-Strait relations and Beijing allowing 
it the freedom to do so. Taiwan kept nearly all of the nations with which 
it had formal diplomatic relations. Beijing did not try to take them away 
and even suggested to some that they not seek to establish formal ties 
with China.327 Now the Chinese leadership might terminate this “conces-
sionary” policy toward Taiwan. If China so acted, many of Taiwan’s dip-
lomatic partners would no doubt quickly set up shop (embassies) in Bei-
jing.
The result of that would be, as some in Taiwan have feared, forth-
with losing five or ten diplomatic partners. This would push the number 
of Taiwan’s formal ties down into the teens. If this were to go further,
which it might given the possibility of a bandwagon effect or if China 
were to make this a diplomatic offensive, Taiwan would see the number 
of its embassies reduced to single digits, or worse. This would inevitably 
have a negative impact on the image, and more of, on the Tsai admin-
istration. 
China’s third means of dealing with an unfriendly or provocative 
Taiwan is its military option. This is far from being Beijing’s favored op-
tion, but it cannot be discounted because of the threat Taiwan’s inde-
pendence poses to China. Chinese leaders would see Taiwan seeking 
separation as possibly spreading similar intentions to Tibet and Xinjiang 
Province. Furthermore, China’s President Xi has consolidated his power 
yet is facing serious domestic problems such that to deal with them he 
may want to further promote Chinese nationalism and with that a more 
aggressive foreign policy.328
In any event, Beijing would probably first choose fairly innocuous 
moves such as giving more publicity to its ability to destroy Taiwan’s de-
fenses. Or it might stage military maneuvers near Taiwan. Either would 
cause Taiwan’s trading partners to face increased insurance rates and 
could even disrupt or reduce Taiwan’s trade.329 Beijing could always 
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(Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006), pp. 66-67 for an account of this and more happening before. 
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move on from there to escalate its threat likely without provoking anyone 
to assist Taiwan or come to its rescue. 
The Tsai administration would, of course, seek out the United States 
to come to its rescue if China were to seriously threaten Taiwan. Howev-
er, there are a number of reasons to doubt whether this would be success-
ful.
First, Beijing’s actions just mentioned, at least up to the military 
one, will most likely seem mild, unthreatening, and short of being suffi-
ciently provocative to justify the United States making any serious re-
sponse. Certainly Washington would not be able to arouse public opinion 
at home or garner support from Asian allies to act against anything less 
than truly threatening Chinese acts. Yet less than menacing moves by 
China would be lethal to Taiwan’s economy and to Tsai and the DPP’s 
reputations.
Second, U.S. foreign policy makers will likely recall the deliberate 
provocations the previous DPP administration made and the U.S. reac-
tion, which was to view Chen and the DPP as loose cannons wanting to 
incite a conflict between America and China to their advantage. Ameri-
can policy makers must see some resemblance to the situation now.  Af-
ter the election the U.S. sent words of caution to Tsai about igniting 
cross-Strait tension.330 If she doesn’t listen, or if the U.S. perceives this,
how can she expect the U.S. to render help? 
Third, the United States is already involved in conflict situations 
and/or serious foreign policy problems elsewhere: with ISIS, with Russia 
in Ukraine, Iran, and more. Washington does not want to add Taiwan to 
the list. As noted earlier public opinion surveys in the U.S. show that the 
American population does not want to engage China’s military over 
Taiwan. 
Fourth, as noted above the United States needs cordial relations 
with China to effectively deal with a host of important problems ranging 
from the global financial situation to global warming. This is likely to be 
truer and even more salient in the future. 
Fifth, it is the reality that Washington cannot easily influence much 
less effectively coerce China anymore. This has been shown in Ameri-
ca’s arguably feeble responses to China’s assertive cum aggressive ac-
tions in the South China Sea. In any case, China has not been moved 
much by them. It is also doubtful sanctions will work against China. An-
yway they are viewed as unwise and unfeasible because China is “too big 
to fail” and owing to China’s huge and diversified economy America 
 330.  Matthew Pennington, “US urges post-election Taiwan-China talks,” China Post, Feb-
ruary 13, 2016 (online at chinapost.com.tw). 
78 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES
cannot cause pain to China without hurting itself while countries that 
might be willing to cooperate with any such plan will be hard to find.331
There is also no meaningful support outside of the U.S. government, 
such as in the media or academe, for Taiwan’s separation even though 
both applauded Tsai and the DPP’s election victory and Taiwan’s de-
mocracy and even connect its democracy to its right to choose its future. 
But they are simply not willing to support U.S. military action. Also, in 
counterpoint it is said there is an element in academic and the media that 
wishes that the Tsai administration would provoke China to justify 
American abandoning Taiwan. This would, in their view, finally end 
Washington’s “wrong” involvement in the Chinese civil war, remove the 
only real obstacle to better U.S.-China relations, and get the U.S. out of a 
situation that might lead to military conflict and possibly war. 
Tsai and clearer minds in the DPP no doubt understand this situa-
tion. As noted, Tsai has avoided provoking China or the United States. In 
the immediate wake of the election she promised that she would “bear 
the responsibility” of maintaining peace and stability on regional is-
sues.332 There is no reason to think she was not serious about this. Yet if 
the DPP does not push for Taiwan’s separate sovereignty, no one, at least 
no organization of any significance, will protest. There have been politi-
cal parties in Taiwan founded on the call for independence. They have 
come and gone. An independence party formed during the campaign; but 
it got few votes. The independence issue may die without DPP sup-
port.333
Summing up, Tsai and the DPP won the election handily. That sug-
gests they are ready to govern and they have good ideas and public sup-
port. Still, governing will not be easy for them given the challenges they 
face. 
 331.  Zack Cooper and Eric Lorber, “Sanctioning the Dragon,” National Interest,
March/April 2016, pp. 36-42. 
 332.  George Liao, “Tsai to maintain close and friendly relations with U.S.,” Taiwan News,
January 18, 2016 (online at taiwannews.com.tw). 
 333.  Some Chinese officials have told this writer that if they can deal with the DPP and it 
abandons the cause of independence it will become a dead issue, as was not the case when the 
KMT was in power. 
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